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INTRODUCTIONJ met Lillian Hellman once, in November 1983, seven months before
she died. For two hours on a Sunday evening, we talked in the large
living room of her apartment on Manhattan's Park Avenue. The physi-
cal presence of this doyenne of American literature, whose plays I had
first read in high school, was startling. She was tiny, a wisp of a woman,
physically wasted from various illnesses. She could not stand, moved her
arms and head only with great difficulty, and was almost blind. But her
distinctive, heavily lined face, even if drawn, was unmistakable, with its
prominent nose and the once-bright, now-dim eyes. Even then, in her
weakened condition, she chain-smoked cigarettes, defiantly holding them
with a roach clip. This was the fiery, feisty, indomitable Lillian Hellman
* Partner, Kornstein Veisz & Wexler, New York City. B.S. 1968, City College of
New York; J.D. 1973, Yale University. This Article grew out of a talk on the same
subject given by the author at The Law and Humanities Institute in New York City on
April 14, 1987.
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I had expected.1
Lillian Hellman was an important playwright,2 successful screen-
writer,3 and best-selling author of memoirs.' A controversial figure, she
gathered supporters and detractors during her lifetime, and she continues
to generate controversy even after her death at age 79 in June 1984. The
controversy revived recently with the publication of a bevy of new biog-
raphies.' "[O]ne is never done with Hellman," writes Carl Rollyson in
one of these biographies.6 "To read Hellman, even to read about her, is
to start an argument," he adds.7 She is, according to Rollyson, "an
American writer about whom controversy will continue for as long as
she is read."'
Hellman's life and work have been analyzed and criticized from many
points of view.9 Her left-wing politics, particularly her attitude toward
1. Dashiell Hammett's biographer reacted similarly upon observing Hellman's vital-
ity during her illness. See D. Johnson, Dashiell Hammett: A Life 301 (Fawcett Colum-
bine paperback ed. 1985).
The purpose of my visit was to see if she could help actress Vanessa Redgrave, whom I
represented, in a lawsuit against the Boston Symphony Orchestra. See infra note 250 and
accompanying text. If Hellman's body was weak, her mind was still clear and sharp. She
already understood the essentials of Redgrave's case, and offered unorthodox and com-
bative suggestions. In biting and uninhibited language, Hellman compared her own
plight during the McCarthy era to Redgrave's situation. She spoke bitterly of how black-
listing had hurt her and "Hammett," her long time companion, whose black and white
photograph rested in a frame on a nearby table.
2. Lillian Hellman's plays include: The Children's Hour (1934); Days to Come
(1936); The Little Foxes (1939); Watch on the Rhine (1941); The Searching Wind (1944);
Another Part of the Forest (1946); Montserrat (1949) (adaptation); The Autumn Garden
(1951); The Lark (1955) (adaptation); Candide (1957); Toys in the Attic (1960); My
Mother, My Father and Me (1963) (adaptation). Hellman "was the first woman to
achieve international status as a playwright, and as such became a symbolic figure to
educated women all over the world." P. Johnson, Intellectuals 288 (1988).
3. Lillian Hellman's screenplays include: North Star (1943); The Searching Wind
(1946); The Chase (1966).
4. Lillian Hellman's memoirs include: An Unfinished Woman (1969); Pentimento
(1973); Scoundrel Time (1976); and Maybe (1980).
5. See P. Feibleman, Lilly: Reminiscences of Lillian Hellman (1988); R. Newman,
Cold War Romance: Lillian Hellman and John Melby (1988); C. Rollyson, Lillian
Hellman: Her Legend and Her Legacy (1988); W. Wright, Lillian Hellman: The Image,
The Woman (1986). An authorized biography by William Abraham, Hellman's friend
and editor, is expected soon.
6. C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 14.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 13.
A series of articles in the English newspaper The Observer, following the London
opening of the play Lillian, also fueled new controversy about Hellman. See Davie, Lil-
lian Hellman: Life as Fiction, The Observer, Nov. 9, 1986, at 60 [hereinafter Life as
Fiction] (criticizing inaccuracies in Hellman's writings); Davie, The Life and Lies of Lil-
lian Hellman, The Observer, Oct. 26, 1986, at 64 [hereinafter Life and Lies] (further
criticizing Hellman); Redgrave, When the Little Foxes Come Out of Their Lair, The Ob-
server, Nov. 2, 1986, at 12 (defending Hellman as "a very special lady of absolute integ-
rity"). Two recent books about Hellman's antagonist Mary McCarthy have added to the
debate. See C. Gelderman, Mary McCarthy: A Life (1988); M. McCarthy, How I Grew
(1986).
9. See, e.g., J. Bryer, Conversations with Lillian Hellman (1986) (collection of inter-
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Stalinism, have been scrutinized. Her literary style has been studied.
Her role during the blacklisting era has been questioned. Her fidelity to
facts in her memoirs has been doubted. Her personality has been faulted.
Her motives in suing fellow writer Mary McCarthy for libel have been
condemned.
At least one perspective on Hellman, however, remains unexplored-
the perspective of the law. Surprisingly, law played a highly prominent
role in Lillian Hellman's life and work. Her influence was not limited to
the legal themes that appeared frequently in her work; Hellman had a
genuine impact on the law."° In reviewing her work and life from this
perspective, one is struck by the many connections between Hellman and
the law. Her biographers and literary critics, by ignoring the legal van-
tage point, have failed to plumb the complex depths of Hellman's psyche.
Examining Lillian Hellman's life and work from a legal perspective
illuminates aspects of both. Lillian Hellman's life and work demonstrate
the reciprocal relationship and the points of contact between law and
literature, a promising and rapidly growing field of study."1 Hellman's
views); B. Dick, Hellman in Hollywood (1982) (description of screenwriting days); M.
Estrin, Lillian Hellman: Plays, Films, Memoirs (1980) (evaluation of work); D. Falk,
Lillian Hellman (1978) (biography); P. Feibleman, supra note 5 (personal memoir by
companion of last several years); S. Hook, Out of Step 125, 220, 389, 503 (1987) (various
criticisms of Hellman's politics); P. Johnson, supra note 2, at 288-305 ("one to whom
falsehood came naturally"; nasty criticism of Hellman's whole life); R. Moody, Lillian
Hellman, Playwright (1972) (discussion of plays and life); R. Newman, supra note 5 (dis-
cussing romantic interest during McCarthyism); C. Rollyson, supra note 5 (biography
both critical and sympathetic); W. Wright, supra note 5 ("critical biography"); Davie,
Life and Lies, supra note 8 (attacking "lies" in Hellman's life and works); Gellhorn, On
Apocryphism, 23 Paris Rev. 280 (Spring 1981) (criticizing alleged falsehoods in Hellman
memoirs, especially about Spanish Civil War); Glazer, An Answer to Lillian Hellman,
Commentary, June 1976, at 36 (taking issue with Hellman's account of McCarthy era);
Hook, The Case of Lillian Hellman, Encounter, Feb. 1977, at 82 (criticizing Scoundrel
Time for inaccuracy); Howe, Lillian Hellman and the McCarthy Years, Dissent, Fall
1976, at 378 (same); Kazin, The Legend of Lillian Hellman, Esquire, Aug. 1977, at 28
(same); Kramer, The Black List and the Cold War, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1976, § 2, at 1,
cols. 4-6 [hereinafter Black List] (same); Kramer, The Life and Death of Lillian Hellman,
The New Criterion, Oct. 1984, at 1 [hereinafter Life and Death] (criticism of life, politics
and inaccuracies in memoirs); McCracken, Julia & Other Fictions by Lillian Hellman,
Commentary, June 1984, at 35 (evidence of factual inaccuracies in Hellman memoirs).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 156-263.
11. As one federal judge recently wrote, "it is only since the publication in 1973 of
James Boyd White's The Legal Imagination, a book that audaciously claims that the
study of literature should be a part of legal education, that a distinct, self-conscious field
of law and literature can be said to have emerged." R. Posner, Law and Literature: A
Misunderstood Relation 12 (1988); see also id. at 12 n.26 (listing articles and symposia);
R. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (1984) (analyzing important roles of
law and literature in pre-Civil War America); B. Thomas, Cross-Examinations of Law
and Literature (1987) (examining relationship between law and literature in American
culture); R. Weisberg, The Failure of the Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modem
Fiction (1984) (discussing legal themes in modem novel); J. White, Heracles' Bow: Es-
says on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (1985) (exploring pieces of literature for legal
meaning and style); J. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning (1984) (study of selected
literary texts for possible impact on law).
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literary work embraces legal themes12 and includes lawyers among its
characters.1 3 Her writing reveals how law is refracted in a literary me-
dium. Sensitivity to these refracted legal themes increases our under-
standing and enjoyment of Hellman's work, and, reciprocally, provides
insight into the law. Some of Hellman's writing itself has generated legal
controversy. 14 Hellman pursued several lawsuits over the years to de-
fend what she viewed as basic freedoms and to raise other important
legal issues.15 In Hellman's case, as much as her writings and life reveal
about law, the pervasive legal themes also reveal much about her.
I. HELLMAN'S LITERARY WORK
One school of literary thought, which includes Gustave Flaubert and
Marcel Proust, believes the written text is everything and the writer's
personality nothing in the search for meaning of an author's work.1 6 Ac-
cording to that school, only the author's work counts, not the author.
The artist must make posterity believe that he or she never existed. The
non-writing part of an author's life, wrote Proust in Against Sainte-
Beuve, "is the product of a quite superficial self, not of the innermost self
which one can only recover by putting aside the world and the self that
frequents the world."17 In one's writing, Proust continued, "it is the se-
cretion of one's innermost life, written in solitude and for oneself alone,
that one gives to the public."1"
Proust's comments have particular cogency for Hellman's plays. The
plays, unlike the memoirs, were written early in Hellman's career. They
are, by definition of the genre, more imaginative, less defensive, and more
spontaneous than the self-conscious memoirs. 9 Of the two main genres
of Hellman's writings, therefore, her plays provide a better index to her
attitudes toward law and lawyers. Three of Hellman's plays-The Chil-
dren's Hour, Days to Come and Watch on the Rhine--contain conspicu-
ous and important legal themes or characters.
12. See infra notes 16-64 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
14. Her first play, memoirs, and last will and testament all figured in lawsuits. See
infra notes 172-223, 236-49 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 172-223, 249 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., T.S. Eliot, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in The Selected Prose of
T.S. Eliot 37-44 (F. Kermode ed. 1975); T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of
Criticism, id. at 79-96; W. Wimsatt & M. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy, in W. Wim-
satt, The Verbal Icon 3-18 (1967). But see E. Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation 1-23
(1967) (unable to attach any determinate meaning to text).
17. Naipaul, On Being a Writer, N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 23, 1987, at 7 (quoting
Proust).
18. Id. In a similar vein, W. Somerset Maugham wrote in one of his most famous
books, "A man's work reveals him.... [I]n his book or his picture the real man delivers
himself defenceless [sic] .... To the acute observer no one can produce the most casual
work without disclosing the innermost secrets of his soul." W. Maugham, The Moon and
Six-pence 130-31 (Bantam ed. 1919).




1. The Children's Hour
The Children's Hour, Hellman's first play, is a drama about a libel
lawsuit. The play turns on false accusations of lesbianism made against
two teachers by one of their young students. Believing the lies, the stu-
dent's grandmother circulates the accusations and has the two women
fired and the school closed. The two teachers sue the grandmother for
libel, but lose the case because a witness, whose misleading comment led
to the student's charges and who could clear the teachers, refuses to tes-
tify. Although lesbianism-still a sensitive subject, but more so in 1934
when the play was written-is an element in the play, its real theme is
the destructiveness of slander-the devastation caused by a lie.2"
Approaching The Children's Hour as a play about libel supplies sym-
metry to Hellman's life insofar as it calls to mind her famous libel suit
against Mary McCarthy near the end of her life.2" Hellman understood
the dramatic potential of legal cases. Indeed, the courtroom process has
had a perennial hold on lovers of drama. 2 Apparently, Hellman got the
idea for her first play from a real case. In 1933, Dashiell Hammett
brought to Hellman's attention a collection of noteworthy British court
cases called Bad Companions by William Roughead. z3 One chapter,
Closed Doors, or the Great Drumsheugh Case, concerned two headmis-
tresses of a girls' school in Scotland accused by a student of having a
lesbian relationship. After the scandal led to the school's closing, one of
the headmistresses sued for libel. This true story about a libel suit in-
spired The Children's Hour. It was neither the first nor the last time an
actual court case inspired an imaginative writer.2 4
20. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 70; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 109; Gilroy, The
Bigger the Lie, reprinted in J. Bryer, supra note 9, at 25.
21. For a discussion of the Hellman-McCarthy libel case, see infra notes 172-214 and
accompanying text. Indeed, we wonder at the words Hellman's characters speak when
the victim announces her intent to sue for libel. "That will be very unwise," says the
potential defendant. Six Plays by Lillian Hellman 50 (Vintage ed. 1979) [hereinafter Six
Plays]. "Very unwise-for you," replies the victim. Id. Did Hellman recall those lines
when deciding to sue McCarthy? Thus libel plays a prominent role in Hellman's first
play and at the end of her life.
22. An adversary trial is "a ready-made dramatic technique .... [F]ew social prac-
tices are so readily transferable to a literary setting as the trial or so well suited to the
literary depiction of conflict." R. Posner, supra note 11, at 78.
23. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 60; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 86, 89, 91-92,
102. Wright notes that "Hellman would begin her career as a public figure with the
accusation that she had presented fact as fiction, and she would exit from it with the
opposite accusation-that she presented fiction as fact." Id. at 102.
24. See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 11, at 80 n.18; see also M. Levin, Compulsion
(1956) (fictionalized account of Loeb-Leopold murder case); J. McGinniss, Blind Faith
(1989) (non-fiction account of Rob Marshall murder case); J. McGinniss, Fatal Vision
(1983) (non-fiction account of Jeffrey MacDonald murder case); L. Uris, QB VII (1970)
(fictionalized account of author's libel trial); Collins, Steinberg and Myerson Trials: 2
Cases Provoke Many Books, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1989 at 1, col. 1 (discussing two recent
cases and books they have spawned).
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The Children's Hour introduces legal themes in its first line of dia-
logue. The play opens with a student practicing Portia's "quality of
mercy" speech from The Merchant of Venice. This opening has great
significance for several reasons. Portia is one of Shakespeare's leading
legal characters." In the role of judge in Shylock's strange lawsuit
against Antonio for a pound of flesh, Portia personifies a certain concept
of law. She understands that law, to be sensible, requires judicial discre-
tion. The rigor of the law, Portia thinks, must be softened with equity
and mercy and tempered by individual circumstances. In her "quality of
mercy" speech, Portia verbalizes an equitable concept of law that should
inform all legal proceedings.26 By having the student practice Portia's
speech, Hellman introduces this theme into The Children's Hour. As the
teacher tells the practicing student, "You are pleading for the life of a
man."
27
Mercy, however, is a quality not shown by many of the characters in
The Children's Hour. They are quick to believe the worst about the inno-
cent victims. 28 In believing false rumors about others, Hellman's charac-
ters provide another link with Portia and The Merchant of Venice.
Shakespeare's play teaches that things are not always as they appear.29
Portia appears to be a male judge, but is only wearing a disguise. She
appears to believe in mercy, but ultimately is cruel to Shylock. Similarly,
in The Children's Hour, things are not always as they appear. A pupil
eavesdrops on part of a conversation that gives the impression of a les-
bian relationship, when in fact none exists.30
Hellman also drew on the law in The Children's Hour in her portrayal
of what amounts to a classic cross-examination. Although not a lawyer,
Dr. Joe Cardin effectively cross-examines the student who started the
malicious rumor. He probes until Mary Tilford says, "I looked through
the keyhole and they [the teachers] were kissing. ... ,3" But when Mary
learns there is no keyhole on the door in question, she breaks down:
"Everybody is yelling at me. I don't know what I'm saying with every-
body mixing me all up. I did see it! I did see it!"32 A few moments later,
however, Mary changes her story, now declaring, "It was Rosalie who
saw them. I just said it was me so I wouldn't have to tattle on
25. See R. Posner, supra note 11, at 91-99.
26. See id. at 96; Kornstein, The Strange Case of Shylock v. Antonio, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 2,
1987, at 2, col. 3.
27. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 7.
28. "I know that it is true," says one character. Id. at 51. "I didn't mean you any
harm. I still don't," says the person speaking the lies. Id. Even the boyfriend of one of
the maligned teachers doubts her. See id. at 67.
29. See H. Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare 81-116 (1951).
30. Hellman takes the point about misleading appearances one step further by having
one of the teachers later confess that she had secretly lusted after the other teacher, dem-
onstrating that what appeared to be innocence may have masked something else. See Six
Plays, supra note 21, at 71.
31. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 54.




After pointing out the holes in Mary's story, Joe takes a page from the
Apocrypha and, like Daniel in "The Story of Susanna,"' 34 cross-examines
Rosalie, the other student, who fails to corroborate Mary's version.
When questioned, Rosalie tearfully exclaims: "I never saw any such
thing. Mary always makes things up about me and everybody else."
35
Only when Rosalie succumbs to a form of blackmail does she lie and
recant. This passage paints a chilling portrait of perjury being suborned.
Despite Joe's telling cross-examination, the teachers lose their libel suit
because a key witness, who professes to be their friend, leaves the juris-
diction and refuses to testify. This teaches a legal lesson-the impor-
tance of preserving important testimony by way of deposition before
trial. It also teaches that the failure to act is itself evil. Mere protesta-
tions of friendship are not enough. Testimony in court-positive ac-
tion-is required, because passivity in the face of evil is equally evil.
The play also speaks about tolerance and intolerance. The victims suf-
fer because of intolerant attitudes toward certain private sexual behavior
between consenting adults. Hellman insisted the play was not about les-
bianism but about slander.36 The specific subject matter of the libel,
however, forces us to examine the Constitution's as well as our own atti-
tudes toward homosexuality, toward all forms of private sexual conduct,
and, more generally, toward privacy and tolerance of individual differ-
ences in society. Tolerance of different sexual needs breeds tolerance of
different political creeds, an issue at the heart of the individual's relation-
ship to society.37 Had the teachers been accused of being communists,
rather than lesbians, the play would foreshadow events in Hellman's own
life, particularly her own contact with McCarthyism.
Hellman's parting comment on lawyers in The Children's Hour is any-
thing but happy. After events have run their course and the teachers'
innocence is revealed too late, one of the teachers voices her disenchant-
ment with things she had previously idealized. "And every word will
33. Id.
34. In "The Story of Susanna," a young Daniel shows the innocence of a wrongly
accused woman by cross-examining each of the two witnesses against her separately and
out of each other's presence. The glaring inconsistencies in the versions of the two accus-
ers belie their accusations and prove their own wrongdoing. See The Story of Susanna, in
The Apocrypha 349-53 (Modem Library ed. 1959).
35. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 56.
36. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 70; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 109; Gilroy,
supra note 20, at 25.
37. Evidence of this, if any were needed, would surely include the continuing consti-
tutional debate over privacy in the sexual realm, including the questions still raised by
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law prohibiting sale of
contraceptives to married couples), the uncertain status of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (upholding constitutional right to abortion), and the power of the state to punish
private sexual conduct in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state law
criminalizing homosexual sodomy as applied to adult defendant's conduct in his own
home with consenting adult partner).
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have a new meaning" she says, "Woman, child, love, lawyer-no words
that we can use in safety any more."38 Hellman echoes the familiar com-
plaint about the failure of the law and lawyers to fulfill their promise of
making justice triumph over injustice.39
2. Days to Come
Hellman continued her treatment of legal themes in her next play,
Days to Come. Written in 1936, it depicts the individuals involved in a
labor strike in the midwest. At the suggestion of his lawyer, who is also
his best friend, the well-meaning owner of the business hires unscrupu-
lous strikebreakers who stir up violence and tragedy. The strikebreakers
later try to frame one of the union organizers for a murder committed by
one of their own.
The play's plot closely parallels the Haywood case, one of the most
famous labor cases tried by Clarence Darrow.' In 1899, Idaho governor
Frank Steunenberg called in United States Army troops to end a labor
strike by defeating the Western Federation of Miners. In 1905,
Steunenberg was killed by a bomb in front of his home. The authorities
suspected that the union had taken revenge. The union asked Darrow to
defend its leaders who were accused of the murder.
The 1907 murder trials in Idaho became a widely publicized court-
room battle between capital and labor.41 During the trials, Darrow ex-
pounded political and social arguments in favor of the labor movement.
In one of the trials, Darrow told the jury that the defendant was part of
the worker's struggle in a "world-wide contest ... between the rich and
the poor."'42 In the trial of "Big Bill" Haywood, secretary-treasurer of
the miners' union, Darrow explained in his summation how important
the case was "to a great movement which represents the hopes and the
wishes and the aspirations of all men who labor to sustain their daily
life."43 The jury acquitted Haywood, and the case became a well-known
episode of American labor history.'
Whether Hellman made a conscious connection between Darrow's
trial and Days to Come is uncertain. The parallels are certainly there,
and her social, economic and political views suggest she was familiar
38. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 66.
39. See, e.g., J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice 12 (1976) (criticizing bar for distributing
justice "according to race, ethnicity, and wealth, rather than need"); D. Kairys, The
Politics of Law 6 (1982) (essays presenting "a progressive, critical analysis of the opera-
tion and social role of the law in contemporary American society").
40. See C. Darrow, The Story of My Life 127 (1932); C. Darrow, Attorney for the
Damned 410-88 (A. Weinberg ed. 1957); I. Stone, Clarence Darrow for the Defense 214-
83 (1941).
41. See sources cited supra note 40.
42. C. Darrow, Attorney for the Damned, supra note 40, at 440-41.
43. Id. at 443-44.




with famous labor struggles." Nevertheless, even if there is no direct
connection to Darrow's case, Days to Come drew on a fund of common
lore. The legal struggle between capital and labor was part of the Ameri-
can experience, especially during the Depression. 46 The use of court in-
junctions and strikebreakers to stop strikes, and the violence that often
ensued, were public knowledge.47 Hellman drew upon these legal strug-
gles in setting up the action in her second play.
A major character in Days to Come is an attorney, whom Hellman
develops as the opposite of Clarence Darrow. Hellman's Henry Ellicott
is the attorney not for the strikers, but for the factory owner. Ellicott,
allied with capital and commercial interests, opposes the strikers. He is
wealthy and lends large sums to his client. He is responsible for bringing
in the violent strikebreakers, knowing they would cause trouble. Ellicott
refers to the local judge as a pal who will not get in the way. Hellman's
portrayal of Ellicott coincides with a persistent stereotype of lawyers as
the handmaidens of the rich and powerful.
But Hellman goes further and exposes deep defects in Ellicott's ethics
and personality. He sleeps with the wife of his best friend and client.
When the client says to him, "You are my lawyer. You must protect
me-," Ellicott responds with a possibly mercenary smile, "Certainly.
Increased protection, increased fees."48 The client-friend later sees
through the attorney's mask of propriety and says: "I know all about
Henry, the rich and worldly Henry, and all the very legal manipulating
he does with his money and with his life."4 9
In the final, revealing scene, the client confronts his attorney:
"[Y]ou've never had anything but toleration for me--and I've never had
45. Her sympathy with the intellectual left leaves no room for doubt here. See C.
Rollyson, supra note 5, at 2; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 13.
46. After decades of highly publicized court rulings curbing the ability of labor un-
ions to organize and to use economic pressure against employers, Congress in 1932
passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, § 1, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1982)), which restricted the power of federal courts to
issue labor injunctions. Then, in 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations
Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)), which
gave affirmative protection to the right to organize and bargain collectively. According
to James MacGregor Bums, the Depression saw a "virtual uprising of workers for union
membership." J. Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox 216 (1956). He continued
that "[w]ith growing unionism came a rash of strikes .... More workers struck in the
summer of 1933 than in the whole period of 1930 and 1931. And the strike wave surged
upward during 1934 and 1935." Id.
47. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921) (holding
employer entitled to injunction against union for restraint of trade despite section 20 of
the Clayton Act); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 99-100, 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (1896)
(injunction preventing defendant from patrolling in front of plaintiff's premises in a con-
spiracy to impede plaintiff's ability to hire workers). See generally F. Frankfurter & N.
Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930) (discussing use of labor injunctions); C. Summers &
H. Wellington, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 12-16, 163-68, 187 (1968) (reviewing
history of labor injunctions).
48. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 87.
49. Id. at 144.
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anything but contempt for you."5 We wonder at how far that comment
goes. Is it limited to the characters' feelings in Days to Come? Or does it
reflect something broader? Is Hellman saying to all lawyers: "I've never
had anything but contempt for you"?5 We glimpse an answer in an-
other Hellman play.
3. Watch on the Rhine
In Watch on the Rhine, Hellman's 1941 play about fighting fascism,
she demonstrates her strong preference for action over words, the latter
personified by verbose and indecisive lawyers. The lawyer character in
Watch on the Rhine is different from Henry Ellicott. David Farrelly has
inherited a place in his famous father's prominent law firm. Living with
his widowed mother in a large house, Farrelly is a cynic, drifting without
much purpose, when we first meet him.
Then Farrelly's sister and her anti-fascist refugee husband come from
Europe to live with them. Farrelly's brother-in-law is an active anti-Nazi
with a price on his head offered by the German government. He has
entered the United States illegally. The play reaches a dramatic climax
when a dilettante house guest threatens to reveal the brother-in-law's
whereabouts to the Nazi German embassy, and the refugee kills the po-
tential informer. Faced with the choice of telling the authorities about
the murder or allowing his brother-in-law to escape, Farrelly decides to
assist him.
Farrelly progresses from a superficial, weak and wordy character to
one of real strength, able to take action for something he believes in.
Hellman depicts Farrelly's growth by comparing the futility of words to
the power of action, finding action far more noble and effective.
The most celebrated example in drama of a tension between thought
and action is Shakespeare's Hamlet. Indeed, these traits have led some
observers to see in Hamlet certain lawyer-like characteristics. Hamlet's
hesitancy and indecision in seeking revenge for his father's murder are
similar to equivocal legalizing, his postponements resemble legalistic
delays."
As Professor Richard Weisberg writes in his provocative book, The
Failure of the Word, "Hamlet's procedures are those of a lawyer, not an
aristocrat or hero. Everything must be proven to him, even the self-evi-
dent... [E]ndless cross-examination and prolix argumentation become
his mode." 3
50. Id. at 145.
51. She may have felt that way after an encounter in 1942 with prominent civil liber-
ties lawyer, Morris Ernst, who apparently led a double life as an informant for J. Edgar
Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt on persons with leftist leanings. See C. Rollyson, supra
note 5, at 188-89.
52. See, e.g., R. Weisberg, supra note 11, at 9; Kornstein, Hamlet and the Law,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
53. R. Weisberg, supra note 11, at 8.
[Vol. 57
LILLIAN HELLMAN
The key to Hamlet's "legalistic proclivity," as Weisberg calls it, is his
verbosity. Hamlet, like many lawyers, talks too much. An inactive,
wordy character, he prefers the safety of words to the risks of action.
Speech, for Hamlet, replaces action. He uses words to hide from, and
sometimes to recast reality. His futile wordiness prevents him from do-
ing anything to right the wrong he so keenly feels. Rather than act,
Hamlet talks.54
In Watch on the Rhine, David Farrelly breaks free of the Hamlet syn-
drome. At the start of the play, Farrelly, like Hamlet, is unwilling to act
to confront evil. He later sheds his Hamlet-like traits and progresses to
the point where words and passivity are no longer enough. He stops
talking and acts.
In a broader sense, Hellman's portrayal of lawyer Farrelly may help
explain fundamental aspects of modem culture. Lawyer-like protago-
nists in nineteenth and twentieth century literature, like Farrelly in
Watch on the Rhine, frequently combine the two fundamental cultural
themes of ressentiment, a sense of perpetual rancor and legalism." This
is the central theme of Weisberg's Failure of the Word,56 although he
does not mention Hellman. Weisberg draws upon the works of Dosto-
yevsky, Flaubert, Camus and Melville. 7 In these examples of lawyer-
like protagonists, Weisberg finds the "legalistic ressentiment" an integral
part of modem fiction. Hellman's Watch on the Rhine fits this mold.
For most of the play, Farrelly exhibits legalistic ressentiment, display-
ing disguised rage against imagined insults. Like other ressentient indi-
viduals, Farrelly has a lingering sense of injury without having firm
values. He perceives a discrepancy between what he considers his own
worth and the position accorded him by others, particularly his belittling
mother. He displays the legalism that makes him "prefer the safety of
wordiness to the risks of spontaneous human interaction."59
Juxtaposed against these negative traits are the attractive qualities of
Farrelly's anti-Nazi brother-in-law. While less articulate than Farrelly,
the brother-in-law is well adjusted and fulfilled. He displays a keen intel-
ligence and combines action with reason. Unlike his verbose legal coun-
terpart, the brother-in-law responds quickly and effectively, albeit
nonverbally, to evil through his leadership of the resistance. He sponta-
neously partakes of all the fullness of reality.6
54. See id. at 4, 8-9; see also Kornstein, supra note 52, at 2, col. 3 (discussing Hamlet's
verbosity). But see R. Posner, supra note 11, at 64-65 (discussing other theories for Ham-
let's inaction).
55. See R. Weisberg, supra note 11, at xiii.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 43-176.
58. See id. at xiii.
59. See id. at xi. But cf R. Posner, supra note 11, at 54-70 (discussing theories for
Hamlet's inaction).
60. For comparisons between verbal and active characters, see R. Weisberg, supra
note I1, at xii, 4, 6-7, 13, 34, 39.
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Tension between these two sets of character traits generates much of
the dramatic energy in Watch on the Rhine. According to Weisberg, the
bitter and resentful verbosity, the sheer wordiness, of fictional lawyers
has led to the failure of modern Western culture.61 This cultural failure
results, in Weisberg's view, from the inadequacy of speech as a substitute
for legitimate action.62 We have been plagued by the "futile wordiness of
legalistic protagonists."63 Hence the genesis of Weisberg's title, The Fail-
ure of the Word, and his subtitle, The Protagonist as Lawyer in Modern
Fiction.
Farrelly's metamorphosis in Watch on the Rhine makes us guardedly
optimistic by showing that ressentiment can be altered and that negative
forces can yield eventually to more positive ethics. In Watch on the
Rhine, Hellman, reflecting our culture's self-image, couples law and lan-
guage to fight evil.
In Watch on the Rhine, Hellman also explores the legal theme inherent
in freedom of expression. The play underscores with vivid dialogue the
way totalitarianism kills the human spirit, atrophies freedom of thought
and belief, and destroys the most basic civil liberties. Insofar as freedom
of expression is part of our cherished legal system, Watch on the Rhine
eloquently defends that freedom. Hellman returns to this theme in later
works and activities."4
Lillian Hellman displayed her preoccupation with law in her plays.
She used legal settings and confrontations to add dramatic effect, to high-
light her perception of lawyers and the legal system, and to express her
attitudes about issues of justice. As a barometer of Hellman's views of
lawyers and the law, the plays reveal more than Hellman's memoirs,
which are important to law and literature for other reasons.
B. The Memoirs
1. The Controversy
Hellman's best-selling memoirs, written toward the end of her life, are
no less provocative than her plays. What they have mainly provoked,
however, is persistent and angry criticism of her alleged inaccuracies or
embellishments in An Unfinished Woman, Pentimento and Scoundrel
Time. Critics have accused Hellman of fabricating people, incidents, and
her own role in events, including the famous Julia episode.65 "Hellman's
61. See id. at xiii.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
65. See W. Wright, supra note 5, at 381, 390, 396, 398, 428, 430; Davie, Life and Lies,
supra note 8, at 64; Davie, Life as Fiction, supra note 8, at 60; Gellhorn, supra note 9, at
280, 289, 291; Glazer, supra note 9, at 38-39; Hook, supra note 9, at 82, 85; Howe, supra
note 9, at 378; Kazin, supra note 9, at 28;McCracken, supra note 9, at 38, 41. In 1983, a
person whom some believe was the real "Julia" wrote her memoirs and caused an anti-
Hellman stir. See M. Gardiner, Code Name Mary (1983); see also C. Rollyson, supra
note 5, at 514-16 (discussing reaction to publication of Gardiner's autobiography); W.
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autobiographical works," wrote one recent critic, "are full of lies."6 6 As
if to highlight this theme, Carl Rollyson takes for the epigraph to his
recent biography the following line from Hellman's play, The Little
Foxes: "God helps those who invent what they need."67
Although Rollyson devotes a significant part of his "critical biogra-
phy" to repeating allegations about Hellman's lying, he makes a few sug-
gestive remarks that should send the Hellman debate off in a new and
more promising direction. "[M]uch of the argument with [Hellman's]
chronology and her plot is beside the point,"6 writes Rollyson. "She
would use dates, seasons, and times of the year to give verisimilitude to
the narrative and not to document where she was and when."69 Notes
Rollyson, "That Hellman hopelessly mixed up dates does not make her a
liar.",7
o
Rollyson raises, in passing, some important questions about literature.
He asks "whether Hellman crossed the line between fiction and fact in
believing in her characters." 71 He refers to "moments in the creative
process when the writer almost believes that his or her characters actu-
ally exist."' 72 In a sentence pregnant with suggestion, Rollyson writes,
"the fictionalizing that assuredly took place seems less important than
the artistic and biographical truth that for Lillian Hellman, Julia was
real."7
3
"There is a sense," Rollyson writes in a desultory tone of partial exon-
eration, "in which all writers are liars and thieves."' 74 Artists, he points
out, often yield to the temptation to embroider and even steal material.75
These provocative statements by Rollyson, occasional and un-
characteristic though they may be, open the door, however slightly, to a
recasting of the issues at stake in the Hellman controversy. From this
new perspective, the factual accuracy or inaccuracy of Hellman's
memoirs-which has been the focus up to now-hardly ends the matter.
On the contrary, factual accuracy may be the wrong or at least not the
only standard by which to measure the "truth" of literary memoirs.
Wright, supra note 5, at 403-11 (same). On the other hand, the charges go both ways.
Wright's recent biography is said to have been "riddled with inaccuracy [and] larded with
untruth." P. Feibleman, supra note 5, at 346.
66. Davie, Life and Lies, supra note 8, at 1, col. 1.
67. C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at vii.
68. Id. at 525.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 526.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 528.
74. Id. at 471.
75. See id. Flaubert put it this way: "I would like to write everything I see, not just
as it is, but transfigured. An exact account of the most magnificent real fact would be
impossible for me. I would still need to embroider it." Quoted in J. Vargas Llosa, Per-
petual Orgy 126 (1986).
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2. The Role of Truth in Law
Criticism of Hellman's attitude toward truth in her memoirs evokes an
ongoing debate about the role of truth in another field-the law.76 That
legal debate may provide insight into the definition of truth, how truth
competes with other values, and why truth in literary memoirs, like truth
in law, may itself be a term of art. It is, perhaps, especially appropriate
to use law as an analogy here, as some of these issues might have been
resolved in the Hellman v. McCarthy libel case that ended with
Hellman's death.77
Truth has close ties with the law. A trial is often said to be a search or
"quest for truth."78 Holding the banner aloft, the Supreme Court has
said that "[t]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth."7 9
In a provocative lecture entitled The Search for Truth-An Umpireal
View, former federal judge Marvin Frankel said: "Trials occur because
there are questions of fact. The paramount objective in principle is the
truth."8
We think of the adversary process as a powerful means of hammering
out the truth. To help discover the truth in a legal context, we use vari-
ous rules, devices and traditions. For example, the pretrial discovery
process requires each side to provide the other side with relevant infor-
mation before trial. Discovery of truth at trial is so fundamentally im-
portant that new constitutional rules are applied retroactively when they
affect the integrity of the truth determining process.81 We employ differ-
ent kinds of truth-testing methods, the most obvious of which is cross-
examination. According to legal scholar John Wigmore, cross-examina-
tion is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth."82
Subverting the legal system's search for truth can bring penalties. Per-
jury," suborning of perjury, 4 and obstructing justice 5 are the most ob-
76. See infra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 185-211 and accompanying text.
78. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963
Wash. U.L.Q. 279. "At the level of high art [the courtroom process] is a crucible in
which to purge the dross of events and distil essences of truth." Sedley, Diary, London
Rev. Books, Mar. 5, 1987, at 21.
79. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966). New York State
judge David W. Peck put it similarly: "The object of a lawsuit is to get at the truth and
arrive at the right result." Peck, The Complement of Court and Counsel, in 1 Benjamin
N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures 457, 459 (1970).
80. Frankel, The Search for Truth-An Umpireal View, 30 Rec. A. B. City N.Y. 14,
16 (1975).
81. See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 723-24
(1971); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 298 (1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
82. 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1367, at 32 (3d ed. 1940).
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1982).
85. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1515 (1982).
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vious crimes connected with depriving a court of the truth. In addition,
disciplinary rules require attorneys to comply with their professional ob-
ligations to the truth.
6
If the three volumes of her memoirs are considered Lillian Hellman's
testimony, then the critics are, in effect, indicting her for literary perjury.
Perjury in a legal context, however, requires more than false testimony;
an essential element of perjury is the witness' knowledge, belief, and in-
tent to give false testimony.87 A witness has not committed perjury if she
believes her testimony to be true even if in fact it is false. As any exper-
ienced trial lawyer knows, even truthful witnesses often give inaccurate
testimony.88
One of the difficulties inherent in relying on testimony of witnesses-
difficulties exacerbated by the litigation process-is faulty memory. Dif-
ferent witnesses perceive and remember the same event differently, with-
out intending to lie or to be inaccurate.89 A person might have a good
memory for faces and a poor one for names or sounds. People also tend
to forget unpleasant facts.90 The very act of recounting what happened
or what was observed is likely to produce further inaccuracies. 91 Finally,
witnesses, in order to feel important in the dramatic trial situation (or in
the dramatic literary memoir situation), are likely to convince themselves
of many details that never happened, in effect to "improve" their testi-
86. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102 (1970).
One of the livelier legal controversies of the past several decades has concerned the
precise extent of an attorney's professional responsibility to disclose material facts or to
refrain from a material omission, and to prevent, or report to the court and opposing
counsel, any untrue statement made by a client or a witness. See, e.g., Frankel, supra
note 80, at 37-40; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer:
The Three Hardest Questions, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1469 (1966).
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1982) (witness must "willfully" make statement under oath
"which he does not believe to be true"); see also Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352,
357-58 (1973) (unresponsive answers not criminal under federal perjury statute); United
States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114, 117-18 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of falsity at time statements
made necessary for perjury conviction), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971); United States v.
Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967) (essence of crime of perjury is witness' belief
concerning truth of statement).
88. See, e.g., J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadbourn & J. Mansfield, Cases and
Materials on Evidence 223-28 (6th ed. 1973) (casebook discussion of inherent weaknesses
of testimonial proof); F. Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination 142-67 (1936) (chapter
on "fallacies of testimony"); J. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof §§ 191-202, at
386-410 (1937) (discussing accuracy of sense perception).
89. See generally E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979); L. Taylor, Eyewitness
Identification (1982); P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases (1965).
90. See Siegal, Inability to Remember-Its Analysis in Medicolegal Orientation, 45 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 151, 152-56 (1954); see also Coburn & Fahr, Amnesia and the
Law, 41 Iowa L. Rev. 369, 370-71 (1956) (discussing medical conditions associated with
memory loss); Redmont, The Psychological Basis of Evidence Practices: Memory, 50 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 249, 255 (1959) (greater recall for pleasant than unpleasant
experiences).
91. See, e.g., R. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent xiii (1970); J. Frank & B. Frank,
Not Guilty 200-02 (1957).
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mony for the stage (or the book). Aware of the spotlight on them, people
naturally act in a way that makes them look better.
Lillian Hellman knew of memory's central role, both in others and in
herself. She understood from her own experiences how memory affects
testimony.9" As she said in 1980,
There's only x amount you remember clearly-or you think you re-
member clearly. By the time you're 50, let us say, you've seen and
known so many places there is a great deal you do not clearly remem-
ber. I think most people are not willing to see that or admit it if they
do see it. 9 3
Four years earlier, she had said, "Everybody's memory is tricky and
mine's a little trickier than most. . . .9' So important to Hellman was
the subject of memory that she devoted her last book, Maybe, to the
intriguing process of memory. "I want always to go back to the theme of
this book," she wrote. "To memory. To what is memory? Where does
memory fit? Who and what influences or changes memory?" 95
Lapses of memory might explain any inaccuracies in Hellman's
memoirs. She was unusually candid about that subject. "But memory
for us all is so nuts," 96 she wrote in Maybe. "It's no news that each of us
has our own reasons for pretending, denying, affirming what was there
and never there." 97 Yet such candor still assumes the supremacy of
truth.
3. Truth Is Not Supreme in Law
Even law, with all its respect for truth, falls short of making truth the
supreme value. In many circumstances, the law elevates other values
above truth. As Judge Frankel pointed out, "[M]any of the rules and
devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are not geared for, but are
often suited to defeat, development of the truth."98 The law, for exam-
ple, recognizes several evidentiary privileges or rules99 that prevent cer-
tain evidence from being introduced, because we put a higher premium
on the values protected by the privileges, such as the confidentiality of
the attorney-client relationship, than on truth. Other rationales, includ-
92. In a 1976 interview, Hellman described how she tried to verify a certain fact in
her memoirs by writing to 11 people. "I got back eight answers. Seven had him [Dashiell
Hammett] in places he could never have been, and the years were all wrong. I'm sure
something remained in their head of the truth, but it was checkably inaccurate."
Doudna, A Still Unfinished Woman: A Conversation with Lillian Hellman, reprinted in J.
Bryer, supra note 9, at 195.
93. Id. at 277.
94. Id. at 195.
95. Id. at 279.
96. L. Hellman, Maybe 63 (1980).
97. Id. at 64.
98. Frankel, supra note 80, at 19.
99. These include attorney-client, priest-penitent, marital, doctor-patient, informant
confidentiality and national security.
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ing the need for deterrence, explain the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution."° Thus, truth is far from the only impor-
tant value in the legal process.
Recognizing that other values compete with truth in the legal process
has led to an attitude of greater realism. Bemoaning "[o]ur relatively low
regard for truth-seeking,"1 °1 Judge Frankel stated that, "we are too
much committed to contentiousness as a good in itself and too little de-
voted to truth,"'0 2 that "the search for truth fails too much of the
time,"' ' and that "our adversary system rates truth too low among the
values that institutions of justice are meant to serve."'" "[I]n the last
analysis," Judge Frankel concluded, "truth is not the goal."' 1 5
To former federal judge Simon Rifkind, Judge Frankel's conclusion
was less than startling. Judge Rifkind responded that
in actual practice the ascertainment of the truth is not necessarily the
target of the trial, that values other than truth frequently take prece-
dence, and that, indeed, courtroom truth is a unique species of the
genus truth, and that it is not necessarily congruent with objective or
absolute truth, whatever that may be. '0 6
Rifkind's perceptive analysis of "courtroom truth" is instructive in ad-
dressing the charges of literary perjury made by Hellman's critics.
Rifkind helpfully distinguishes truth in law from truth in poetry and
prose:
When the author of the Song of Solomon says, "I am the rose of
Sharon and the lily of the valleys," no one believes that he is speaking
of horticultural specimens. Nor is he suspected of suborning perjury
when he causes a maiden to avow to her lover, "I have compared thee,
o my love, to a company of horses in Pharaohs chariots." Manifestly,
a poet's perception of the truth is different from that of a speaker of
prose. So, too, I believe, the courtroom has developed its own version
of truth. 10
7
100. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (applying exclusionary rule to
states); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (announcing exclusionary rule
for federal courts).
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule, stating that "'unbending application of the exclusion-
ary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the
truth-finding functions of judge and jury.' An objectionable collateral consequence of
this interference with the criminal justice system's truth-finding function is that some
guilty defendants may go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea
bargains." Id. at 907 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
101. Frankel, supra note 80, at 23.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id. at 15.
105. Id. at 20.
106. Rifkind, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in Modern Society, in H. Edwards
& J. White, The Lawyer as a Negotiator 395, 406 (1977).
107. Id. at 406-07.
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With these suggestive thoughts, we can better evaluate the literary per-
jury "indictment" filed against Hellman's memoirs. Literature, like law,
has its own species of truth, which relies more on artistic insight than
absolute factual accuracy.
4. Truth in Literary Autobiography
The controversy over Hellman's memoirs stems from the ambiguity of
memoirs as an art form. Is autobiography factual history or literary art?
Is there a difference? Central to the criticism of Hellman's memoirs is
the assumption that autobiography must be a recitation of accurate
facts. 0 8 Memoirs are not advertised as non-fiction novels; they do not
usually carry the warning: "Caution. These memoirs contain some im-
aginary persons, events and conversations." Hellman's critics therefore
understandably start with the premise that autobiography depends upon
faithful history.
What if that premise is wrong?
Not all writing is an accurate recitation of facts. Fiction, poetry and
drama, for instance, all thrive without necessarily being anchored in his-
torical facts, although such facts may supply a setting or background.
Other genres, such as the non-fiction novel, blend fact and fiction. 10 9 Yet
in all these genres, even those most dependent on imagination, the au-
thors doubtless claim that they deal in truth, and that their brand of
truth is of a peculiarly profound and esoteric quality." o
Historians debate whether a work of history must be scrupulously ac-
curate or whether imaginative literary style, which may affect or distort
factual accuracy, is permissible."' According to E. H. Carr: "The belief
in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of
the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one
which it is very hard to eradicate." ' 1 2 Thus professional historians,
whose task is to address facts and not fiction, disagree among themselves
about the meaning and existence of faithful history.
108. This assumption emerges clearly from the writings of Hellman's critics. Each
critic attacks her, with varying degrees of venom, for distorting events or inventing facts.
See, e.g., W. Wright, supra note 5, at 426 ("The necessity to argue in defense of writers of
nonfiction sticking to the truth is, for many, unthinkable."); Gellhorn, supra note 9, at
286-301; McCracken, supra note 9, at 43. This assumption also characterizes Mary Mc-
Carthy's deposition testimony. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 516. In a recent book,
Paul Johnson criticizes several writers, including Hellman, for "the characteristic intel-
lectual's belief that, in his own case, truth must be the willing servant of his ego." P.
Johnson, supra note 2, at 154.
109. Truman Capote's In Cold Blood and Norman Mailer's Executioner's Song are two
well-known examples of the nonfiction novel.
110. "[I]t is one of the proudest boasts of imaginative authors ... that they are convey-
ing truth through their work." P. Gay, Style in History 190 (1974). "Imaginative writers
normally claim that their fictions penetrate to truths of a high and general kind .... But
these free-floating truths emerge from a context of untruths." Id. at 193.
111. See id. at 188-207.
112. E. Carr, What is History? 12 (Penguin ed. 1961).
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Therefore, the controversy over Hellman's memoirs should not come
as a surprise. Experts argue about whether history can be accurately
written by professional historians. Such arguments sharply suggest a for-
tiori that memoirs, especially memoirs of an imaginative author, should
be judged by a standard other than factual accuracy. "I don't think I
rewrote history at all," ' Hellman said in 1977. "I wasn't out to write
history."1 
14
As Hellman's comment emphasizes, memoirs have a literary as well as
historical purpose; they are a form of literature. Autobiography, like any
other genre of literature, depends on creativity and imagination.1 15 This
is particularly true of literary memoirs, written as they are by creative
and imaginative authors, whose talent subordinates facts to artistic vi-
sion.1 16 Memoirs need not be artistic, but we should not reject them
when they are.
From this perspective, the debate over Hellman's memoirs echoes Ar-
istotle's famous comment that poetry is truer than history. A true ren-
dering of an inner reality is what a creative writer tries to convey through
her work. The author of a literary memoir may use her artistic skills to
mold facts with an eye toward the story's probability and coherence. 1 7
The Hellman debate may finally clarify what to expect from memoirs.
Perhaps we err in expecting memoirs to contain absolutely accurate in-
113. D. Rather, A Profile ofLillian Hellman (1977), reprinted in J. Bryer, supra note 9,
at 212.
114. Id. "[I]nventing as well as remembering her life .... is true... of any autobiog-
raphy or memoir-because memory is selective. All writing is, in one sense, fiction, a
construct. But in Pentimento, Hellman is calling it to mind." C. Rollyson, supra note 5,
at 470.
115. As Hammett's biographer wrote of Hellman, fictionalization "is the impulse in
autobiography too, however scrupulous the teller tries to be" to set "the imaginative
world in better order than the real one." D. Johnson, supra note 1, at 305. According to
her companion, "Lillian was in the process of dramatizing her life. She brought to the
business of memory the art of fiction and she was beginning to forge for herself a new
form. Because I was interested in what she was doing it never occurred to me at the time
that people would take all the details of the story for literal truth, since it seemed so clear
that she was fusing fact with fiction .... [S]he'd discovered a new form for herself in
writing, a form that was neither fiction nor memory but a combination of both, which is
probably what most recollection is." P. Feibleman, supra note 5, at 148.
116. W. Somerset Maugham addressed the theme of truth in art in The Summing Up,
where he credited artistic power for departure from literal truths. "Realism is relative,"
Maugham wrote.
The most realistic writer by the direction of his interest falsifies his creatures.
He sees them through his own eyes.... It is not truth he attains, but merely a
transposition of his own personality. And the greater his talent, the more pow-
erful his individuality, the more fantastic is the picture of life he draws. It has
sometimes seemed to me that if posterity wants to know what the world of
today was like it will not go to those writers whose idiosyncrasy has impressed
our contemporaries, but to the mediocre ones whose ordinariness has allowed
them to describe their surroundings with a greater faithfulness.
W. Maugham, The Summing Up 231-32 (1938).
117. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 525.
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formation.118 We should distinguish between autobiographical detail
and autobiographical essence; the facts could be lies, but the book could
be true. Truth can emerge from a context of untruths, just as it does in
fiction.' 1 9
Hellman's critics have a limited understanding of the function of auto-
biography. Both biography and autobiography involve hazards. Freud,
for example, understood those dangers: "'Whoever turns biographer,'"
he once wrote, "'commits himself to lies, to concealment, to hypocrisy,
to embellishments, and even to dissembling his own lack of understand-
ing, for biographical truth is not to be had .... , ",120 If biographical truth
does not exist, autobiographical truth is even less likely to exist; there the
subject and central character is also the writer. Jerome Bruner, a psy-
chologist writing a book on autobiography, recently said that there are
clear "mythic patterns" in the stories people tell about their lives,21 ob-
serving that "[p]eople model their account of their life on a myth, and so
begin living it in those terms."' 122
The late Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas is another mem-
oirist who has recently come under fire for autobiographical mythmaking
in his two volumes of autobiography. 23 According to Professor G. Ed-
ward White, the accuracy of Douglas's memoirs is "often questiona-
118. In this respect, memoirs differ significantly from journalism supposedly built on
facts. This difference was highlighted recently when a writer for The New Yorker was
criticized for changing quotations and inventing conversations for an article. The writer
was quoted as saying that "she had acted only in an effort to get behind the facts to the
truth." Scardino, Ethics, Reporters and the New Yorker, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1989, at
C20, col. 2. Another account relates how "writers at The New Yorker have occasionally
displayed a certain condescension toward the facts in their search for deeper truth," and
that one writer "admitted that he periodically fabricated facts in the magazine because
'there is a truth that is harder to get at and harder to get down towards than the truth
yielded by fact.'" Taylor, Holier Than Thou, N.Y. Magazine, Mar. 27, 1989, at 35.
Former New Yorker editor William Shawn said, "It doesn't mean one should discard
facts or shouldn't respect facts, but the truth has to include something that goes beyond
facts." Id. But The New Yorker staff was still admonished to stick to actual facts. See id.
For a fascinating discussion of some of these issues, see Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (dissenting opinion of Judge Kozinski is of particular
interest).
119. See Lesser, Autobiography and the "I" of the Beholder, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27,
1988, § 7 (Book Review), at 1; see also C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 489 ("As history,
[Hellman's] comments are bunk; as autobiography, they reveal her extraordinary talent
for projecting her personality on the times."); Roiphe, This Butcher, Imagination: Be-
ware of Your Life When a Writer's at Work, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1988, § 7 (Book Re-
view), at 30, col. 3 (quoting Bernard Malamud on the "important distinction between
autobiographical detail and autobiographical essence").
120. P. Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time xv-xvi (1988) (quoting Freud) (emphasis
added).
121. Goleman, Personal Myths Bring Cohesion to the Chaos of Each Life, N.Y. Times,
May 24, 1988, at C11, col. 1 (quoting Bruner).
122. Id.
123. See White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individu-
ality, 74 Va. L. Rev. 17, 17, 28 (1988). The memoirs in question are W. Douglas, Go
East, Young Man (1974), and W. Douglas, The Court Years (1980).
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ble."' 124 Professor White notes that "[t]he version of events offered by
Douglas in his autobiography invariably exaggerated his importance,
while remaining silent about contributions made to his welfare by
others." '25  White observes, in language that might well apply to
Hellman's memoirs, that Douglas's autobiographical volumes are "com-
plex literary documents, akin to works of fiction, in which the author
creates one or more narrative personae, writes in various literary modes,
and attempts to construct an image of a life and to draw lessons from
that construction."' 126
Novelist Robertson Davies has characterized this mythmaking as
"'the inescapable problem of the autobiography: how much is left out,
how much has been genuinely forgotten, how much has been touched up
to throw the subject into striking relief? ... [P]eople dramatize them-
selves when they have a chance.' "127 Neither biography nor autobiogra-
phy can be done " 'except by casting one person as the star of the drama,
and arranging everybody else as supporting players.' ,,128 An autobiogra-
phy is "'a romance of which one is oneself the hero.' "129
This view of autobiography commands growing acceptance today. 130
Literary biographer Leon Edel has stated that embellishment of autobio-
graphical facts is "not an uncommon practice among literary figures."1 31
Northrop Frye and other literary critics have argued that autobiography
"is simply another form of prose fiction, its implied ethical contract with
the reader calling for an overarching truth that is less 'factual' than liter-
ary and psychological." 1 32 The act of retracing one's steps is inevitably a
124. White, supra note 123, at 19. Professor White writes that "[a]ccuracy was clearly
not a primary concern of Douglas' in writing about any portion of his life." Id. at 27.
125. Id. at 30.
126. Id. at 19.
127. R. Davies, World of Wonders 135-36 (Penguin ed. 1975).
128. Id. at 136.
129. Id. at 257.
130. See supra notes 111-29; infra notes 131-37. One is struck by the number of dis-
cussions about this subject in recent years. Rarely does an issue of the Sunday New York
Times not have an article relating in some way to the debate. See, e.g., sources cited
supra note 119; infra notes 136, 138, 145, 146; see also Davies, The Making of a 'Dublin
Smartie', N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1988, § 7 (Book Review), at 42, col. 1 ("Like everyone else
who lives by his imagination, [George Bernard] Shaw constructed a coherent, interesting
romance about his own life with a good deal of added color and detail that is either
pleasing or pathetic.... Perhaps we should remember Ibsen's words about the necessity
to everyone of a 'Life Lie,' which sustains one's self-esteem when truth will not do so.");
Henahan, Did Ives Fiddle With the Truth?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. 1
("sustained effort by [composer Charles] Ives to rewrite his own history").
131. W. Wright, supra note 5, at 26. Ernest Hemingway also has been criticized re-
cently for autobiographical lies. See P. Johnson, supra note 2, at 154; J. Meyers, Heming-
way: A Biography 15-16, 27 (1985); Crews, Pressure Under Grace, N.Y. Rev. Books,
Aug. 13, 1987, at 30. But, as Johnson notes, Hemingway thought that "'[i]t was not
unnatural that the best writers are liars. . . [because a] major part of [a writer's] trade is
to lie or invent.'" P. Johnson, supra note 2, at 154.
132. Kaplan, Play It Again, Nathan, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, § 7 (Book Review), at
3.
Novelists have agreed with this assessment of autobiography. In his recent autobiogra-
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conscious and unconscious act of personal mythmaking, accurately re-
flected in the title of a recent book, Inventing the Truth: The Art and
Craft of Memoir.133
The case of architect Frank Lloyd Wright illustrates the ambivalent
attitude toward the genre of autobiography. A biography by Brendan
Gill takes the architect to task, much as Hellman's critics do, for misstat-
ing facts in his autobiography."' Gill demonstrates that Wright's
memoirs are largely false and unreliable, that they contain manifold dis-
tortions, fantasies, prevarications and chronological inaccuracies that
have kept scholars busy proving why this or that episode could not possi-
bly have occurred in the way Wright described it.'
Another reviewer, however, saw the greater accomplishment beyond
the factual inaccuracies, noting that "in his texts as much as in his archi-
tecture, Wright sought a poetic rather than a literal truth, and more
often than not found it .... [Hie believed he could re-create his life story
to accord with a similarly self-determined vision of his place in the
world."' 3 6 For all its errors, Wright's autobiography, wrote the re-
viewer, "remains by far the most vivid and, in some essential sense, the
most veracious evocation of its chimerical author."' 37
In other media, such as film, critics have acknowledged a distinction
between artistic truth and factual accuracy. One film critic argued, in an
article tellingly headlined Facts Don't Always Give the True Story, 38 that
"films revolving around real individuals draw a distinction between what
is authentic-technically faithful to the facts-and what is true."'' 39
phy, The Facts, Philip Roth wrote that autobiography is "probably the most manipulative
of all literary forms." P. Roth, The Facts 172 (1988).
133. Inventing the Truth: The Art and Craft of Memoir (W. Zinsser ed. 1987). Sidney
Hook's review of this book was appropriately titled: How to Blow Your Own Horn Effec-
tively, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1987, at 24, cols. 4-6. In writing about Hook's own recent
autobiography, Out of Step (1987), Hilton Kramer noted that "we are given a glimpse of
the various ways in which even such renowned literary figures have, like so many lesser
mortals, often edited their memories to suit the needs of the day." Kramer, The Impor-
tance of Sidney Hook, Commentary, Aug. 1987, at 17, 18. Both Hook and Kramer are
among Hellman's critics.
134. See B. Gill, Many Masks: A Life of Frank Lloyd Wright (Ballantine paperback
ed. 1987).
135. See id. at 23-26, 52-54, 485-88, 502.
136. Filler, Looking for Mr. Wright, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, § 7 (Book Review), at
15.
137. Id. The reviewer noted that "Wright's own retelling comes closest to capturing
the broad, messy sweep of his ultimately triumphant career ... striking a distinctive
harmony in tune with an authentic inner voice." Id.
138. Maslin, Facts Don't Always Give the True Story, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, § 5, at
25, col. 1.
139. Id. at col. 3. According to the critic,
The best of these films, even when they take liberties with facts, use real person-
alities to create a larger, more colorful reality than their source material may
have had. On the other hand, when films are reverential about their models and
slavish about their facts, they have a way of losing track of a larger truthfulness.
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In composing her best-selling memoirs, Hellman may have under-
stood, as the film critic wrote, that an "audience's willingness to accept
certain facts about real-life characters usually has more to do with a
film's overall persuasiveness than with the facts themselves.""
Hellman, of course, complicated matters by writing, in the introduc-
tion to a 1979 one-volume edition of all three of her memoirs, "I tried in
these books to tell the truth. I did not fool with facts." 14' But to place
too much weight on Hellman's after-the-fact statement of intent is to fall
victim to the intentional fallacy, just as surely as it is blindly to accept a
poet's later statement of what he intended his verses to mean.' 42
Putting aside Hellman's subsequent statements of intent, her critics, by
invoking the correspondence theory of truth, 143 miss the inexplicable but
beautifully controlled sympathy between the author and her readers."
These critics refuse to be enchanted, humored, taught. They want one
kind of truth-strict factual accuracy, ignoring another kind of truth-
insight. 4 -
Hellman's memoirs deserve a more sympathetic, and less hostile recep-
tion, such as that given by critic Wilfred Sheed. Although he referred to
her memoirs as something Hellman "had quite self-evidently teased into
dramas,"' 46 he nevertheless concluded that "her 'dishonesty' was a per-
fectly legitimate literary device, virtually a branch of rhetoric."'14 7
140. Id.
141. L. Hellman, Three 9 (1979).
142. See W. Wimsatt & M. Beardsley, supra note 16, at 4-5.
143. According to the "correspondence" theory of truth, "truth consists of the agree-
ment of our thought with reality. A belief is called 'true' if it 'agrees' with a fact. Or,
stated otherwise, a belief is true if the ideas contained in it correspond to objects as they
are in fact." J. Randall & J. Buchler, Philosophy: An Introduction 146 (1971).
144. As Peter Feibleman wrote in his recent biography:
Strange that the special fabric of longing [Hellman] worked so hard to weave
would one day be examined thread by thread, picked bare by all those nimble
writers whose finest tools are a magnifying glass and a pair of tweezers, until the
impact of the whole was lost to them because of it.
P. Feibleman, supra note 5, at 149.
145. Another critic recently summed up the situation by stating that an American
gets agitated at the very idea of telling his life's story. He begins to act like a
suspicious character: his hands shake tellingly, his mouth twitches. He knows
he's telling lies, and he knows equally well we're going to catch him at it. So he
brazens it out, either by ignoring the question of truth ... or by purposely
allying his autobiographical venture with fiction. "I'm an artist," he yells, "so
don't expect unvarnished truth from me! What you get here is better than
truth!"
Lesser, supra note 119, at 1. The artist "gives us, in fact, a record that is truer than literal
truth-true, that is to say, by reason of its heartfelt, all-overcoming eloquence." Russell,
Ideas as Ammunition in the French Revolution, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, § 5, at 35, col.
2.




5. Truth as a Hellman Theme
Truth, as a theme, runs through Hellman's writings. In The Chil-
dren's Hour one of the characters says: "Look: everybody lies all the
time. Sometimes they have to, sometimes they don't. I've lied myself for
a lot of different reasons, but there was never a time when, if I'd been
given a second chance, I wouldn't have taken back the lie and told the
truth."14 In The Little Foxes, a character says: "Every time I ever told
a lie in my whole life, I wipe my hands right after." '14 9 In Days to Come,
the following exchange occurs:
Ellicott: That's the second time you've lied about being in town.
Why?
Julie: Maybe because I like to lie. Maybe it's because I'm tired of your
questions. 
150
At the end of An Unfinished Woman, Hellman wrote, "I do regret that
I have spent too much of my life trying to find what I called 'truth,'
trying to find what I called 'sense.' I never knew what I meant by
truth .... 151
Factual accuracy or inaccuracy is not necessarily the only or the most
relevant measure of the "truth" of Hellman's memoirs. Just as law es-
teems other values than truth, so does literature. Both "courtroom
truth" and "literary autobiographical truth" often fail to correspond per-
fectly with historical facts. Both versions of truth, legal and autobio-
graphical, serve important purposes, albeit each must be approached
with caution, lest an unsuspecting lay person believe juries are always
correct or that a literary autobiography is absolutely and historically ac-
curate in every respect.
148. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 52.
149. Id. at 208.
150. Id. at 89.
Another Part of the Forest is a whole play based on a lie. The life of Marcus, the main
character, is a lie. If the truth were known about his betrayal of the Confederacy during
the Civil War, his southern neighbors would have lynched him. This underlying theme is
depicted often in the play. One character says, "Writing can't lie. Specially writing in
ink." Six Plays, supra note 21, at 313. Another says: "Oh, now, I don't believe what
you're saying. One lie, two lies, that's for all of us: but to pile lie upon lie and sin upon
sin, and in the sight of God." Id. at 381.
151. L. Hellman, An Unfinished Woman 284 (1969).
In a 1964 article about Arthur Miller's play After the Fall, Hellman parodied a writer
who sacrificed other values to truth. "'It was agony to put all this down,'" she wrote,
"'but that's what a great writer is here on earth to do. Truth, and only truth, and more
truth.'" W. Wright, supra note 5, at 294 (quoting Hellman). In a letter to Thornton
Wilder, Hellman wrote: "'I have been hampered, of course, by the truth ... "' Id. at
334. Elsewhere, she said: "'What a word is truth. Slippery, tricky, unreliable.'" Id. at
324. In her famous 1952 letter to the House Un-American Activities Committee,
Hellman wrote: "I was raised in an old-fashioned American tradition and there were
certain homely things that were taught to me: to try to tell the truth, not to bear false
witness . . . ." L. Hellman, Scoundrel Time 93 (1976). Hellman's words illustrate an
understanding that truth is elusive; they demonstrate an obsession with truth and its
relationship to art, an obsession spanning a lifetime.
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Does it matter, for example, if there was a Julia? Or whether Hellman
knew her? Isn't the nobility of the Julia character as portrayed in Penti-
mento what is important? The story of Julia is one of heroes and villains,
conflict, courage, and sadness, told with beauty and skill. If a work of
literature accomplishes that much, hasn't it achieved literary truth?152
The real problem with Hellman's memoirs may lie in readers' expecta-
tions. Advertising a book as a "true story" generates different expecta-
tions than advertising it as "fiction." Hellman at least appeared to
present the memoirs as accurate.1 53 But even that assumption is under-
cut by her explanation of "pentimento" as a subjective and impressionis-
tic technique. 154 Readers may have to realize, however, that as a genre,
literary memoirs are not necessarily literally accurate. Like a character
in John Irving's novel, The World According to Garp, readers might want
to say to memoirists: "You have your own terms for what's fiction, and
what's fact, but do you think other people know your system?"1 55
II. HER LIFE AND THE LAW
Although Hellman's writings abound with legal themes, we must also
look at Hellman's life for whatever light it sheds on Hellman's attitude
toward law. The relation of art to life is, of course, complex. In
Hellman's case, the correlation between her personal life, her interior life
and their effects on the legal aspects of her writing is anything but obvi-
ous. Nevertheless, the results are enlightening.
In Hellman's life, as in her writings, the law provides a salient recur-
ring theme. She was involved in several notable lawsuits, some of which
continue to have a lasting effect on the law.1 56 Even apart from these
lawsuits, she was a champion of rights under law.' 57 Hellman's preoccu-
pation with the law could have come from many causes. She was a
strong, sometimes abrasive personality who jealously guarded her own
152. Rollyson shows unusual sensitivity when he writes: "In Pentimento, Julia is a
figure in the autobiographer's imagining of the past, a fantasy functioning more like an
alter ego or dramatic complement to the playwright's personality than a historically veri-
fiable presence in her life. It is essential to the writer's purpose that we do not know more
about Julia, for 'Julia' is meant to be about the way Hellman conceived of her life...
C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 61.
153. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. In a prefatory note to Pentimento, Hellman wrote:
Old paint on canvas, as it ages, sometimes becomes transparent. When that
happens, it is possible, in some pictures, to see the original lines: a tree will
show through a woman's dress, a child makes way for a dog, a large boat is no
longer on an open sea. That is called pentimento because the painter "re-
pented," changed his mind. Perhaps it would be as well to say that the old
conception, replaced by a later choice, is a way of seeing and then seeing again.
L. Hellman, Pentimento 1 (1973).
155. J. Irving, The World According to Garp 227 (Pocket Books ed. 1979).
156. In addition to the several cases discussed in this article, see infra notes 172-223,
249, Hellman also joined in a suit to stop "Nixon from claiming the Watergate tapes and
papers as his personal property." C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 482.
157. See infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
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rights-just the sort of personality to be litigious. She frequently
threatened to sue people, 158 yet her litigiousness was combined with an
understanding of law as an instrument for policy, for social or economic
change, and as a way of vindicating and asserting one's rights.159
A. Civil Liberties
Civil liberties are the jewel in the crown of the American legal system.
We hear again and again about the genius and vital importance of our
Bill of Rights. At the core of the civil liberties is a group of rights as-
sured to individual members of society. Prominent among those basic
individual rights are those guaranteeing freedom of expression,16 ° includ-
ing the right to form and hold beliefs and opinions on any subject, and to
communicate ideas, opinions and information through any medium, in-
cluding speech, writing, music and art. 161
So essential are these rights to democratic government that the
Supreme Court has from time to time referred to them as "preferred"
freedoms.162 Such rights are "preferred" because they are an indispensa-
158. See P. Johnson, supra note 2, at 301 (threatened lawsuits over play, letter to the
House Un-American Activities Committee and over 1981 revival of The Little Foxes); C.
Rollyson, supra note 5, at 393 (threatened to sue directors seeking to film Hammett's life
story); id. at 482 (suit seeking to bar former President Nixon from claiming Watergate
tapes and papers as his personal property); id. at 537 ("always threatening to sue peo-
ple"); id. at 546 (threatened Francis Ford Coppola if he made movie with Hammett as
detective character); W. Wright, supra note 5, at 49 (threatened to sue former lover if he
published her love letters); id. at 263 (threatened to sue students for improper typing).
159. Her acquaintance with lawyers also may have contributed to her view of the law.
Hellman had several friends who were lawyers. Among them were Harvard Law Profes-
sor Mark De Wolfe Howe, see L. Hellman, Pentimento 224, 226-27 (1973), Arthur W. C.
Cowan, a wealthy, eccentric, conservative Philadelphia lawyer who funded liberal causes,
see id. at 211-62; and Ephraim London, a prominent New York attorney.
She respected and appreciated the help of attorneys Abe Fortas, Joseph Rauh and
Daniel Pollitt in connection with the House Un-American Activities Committee
("HUAC") appearance. To Ephraim London, her attorney in the McCarthy libel case,
she wrote a card saying, "My Hero!" C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 524.
Hellman also included lawyers in her memoirs. In Pentimento, Hellman devoted a
whole section to describing her relationship with attorney Arthur Cowan, see L.
Hellman, Pentimento 211-62 (1973), and in Scoundrel Time, she recounted her legal rep-
resentation in connection with her appearance before HUAC. See L. Hellman, Scoundrel
Time 53-58 (1976).
So surrounded by attorneys was Hellman that in 1952, following her HUAC appear-
ance and Hammett's legal troubles, she wrote to literary critic Van Wyck Brooks of
"combing lawyers out of my hair." C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 342.
160. See generally T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression (1970); M.
Ernst, The First Freedom (1946); H. Kalven, A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech
in America (1988).
161. See sources cited supra note 160.
162. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945). Justice Frankfurter spoke of "those liberties of the individual which
history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as against a closed soci-
ety." Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 95 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). According to Justice Car-
dozo, some freedoms form "the matrix, the indispensable condition" of all others. Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937). Thus, "legislation which restricts those polit-
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ble condition for all other rights. Lillian Hellman did more than her
share to defend these preferred freedoms.
Her most famous effort occurred during the dark days of McCarthy-
ism. In the early 1950s, the House Un-American Activities Committee
subpoenaed Hellman to testify about her left-wing politics and associa-
tions. Hellman responded with her well-known letter of May 19, 1952,
in which she explained that she would answer questions about herself but
not about others. She refused to name names. This letter contained her
most memorable line: "I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this
year's fashions ...."I"
The Committee declined her offer. A few months later she appeared
before the Committee and took the same position that she had in her
letter. She was blacklisted and felt in her own life the serious personal
and economic effects of slander which she had depicted in The Children's
Hour. 164
Her confrontation with HUAC is the most well-known incident in this
regard, but it was not the first time she had expressed these views. Her
1941 play, Watch on the Rhine,165 attacked fascism. Earlier, in 1940,
Helman had spoken against the evils of totalitarianism:
I am a writer and I am also a Jew. I want to be quite sure that I can
continue to be a writer and that if I want to say that greed is bad or
persecution is worse, I can do so without being branded by the malice
of people who make a living by that malice. I also want to be able to
go on saying that I am a Jew without being afraid of being called
names or end in a prison camp or be forbidden to walk down the street
at night. Unless we are very careful and very smart... and very pro-
tective of our liberties, a writer will be taking his chances if he tells the
truth, for as the lights dim out over Europe, they seem to flicker a little
here too.1
66
In 1947 Hellman had written an article for the Screen Writers Guild
about political investigations in that industry. "All of us," she wrote,
ical processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legis-
lation" must be "subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny" than most laws. United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The literature on the
"preferred freedoms" approach is extensive. See, e.g., L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law chs. 11-15 (2d ed. 1988); Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-40: Mr. Justice
Stone and "Preferred Freedoms," 65 Yale L.J. 597 (1956); McKay, The Preference for
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1182 (1959).
163. L. Hellman, Scoundrel Time 93 (1976); see also W. Wright, supra note 5, at 246-
47. Hellman's memorable line calls to mind the following statement by conservative law-
yer John W. Davis in the 1930s: "Any lawyer who surrenders this [professional] inde-
pendence or shades his duty by trimming his professional course to fit the gusts of
popular opinion in my judgment not only dishonors himself but disparages and degrades
the great profession to which he should be proud to belong." W. Harbaugh, Lawyer's
Lawyer 199 (Oxford paperback ed. 1973).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 254-59.
165. See supra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.




"who believe in this lovely land and its freedoms and rights... [want] to
keep it good and make it better .... It's still not un-American to fight
the enemies of one's country. Let's fight." ' 16 7
In light of Hellman's palpable efforts in this area, it is curious to read
the revisionist critiques of her role during the McCarthy era. Her critics
claim that she has overemphasized her courage and badly maligned the
rest of the intellectual community by suggesting that most of them were
cowards in the face of McCarthyism. 168 It is easy, a generation later, to
say that Hellman needed little or no courage to do what she did. While it
is true she was not entirely alone in her defiance, there were not then as
many staunch defenders of free expression as there should have been. 169
Decades after those confrontations, Hellman continued to push for
civil liberties. She organized a group called the Committee for Public
Justice that during the 1960s and 70s spoke out in favor of first amend-
ment and other constitutional rights, 170 and investigated FBI abuses,




Even though libelous speech is not protected speech, it is still ironic
when a proponent of free expression sues someone for libel. The irony
increases when both plaintiff and defendant are well-known and accom-
plished literary figures and the case becomes a famous court battle.
Hellman's libel suit against fellow writer, Mary McCarthy, even if not
Hellman's brightest moment, became important as a legal precedent and
is perhaps as entertaining as anything either litigant ever wrote. It grew
out of what some perceive as a "good humored" assault'72 on Hellman
by author and long-time antagonist Mary McCarthy 173 on a television
167. Id. at 214.
168. See, e.g., S. Hook, supra note 9, at 503; V. Navasky, Naming Names 423 (Penguin
ed. 1980); C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 329-30, 489-502; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 248-
54; Glazer, supra note 9, at 38; Howe, supra note 9, at 378-79; Kazin, supra note 9, at 28.
169. See, e.g., V. Navasky, supra note 168, at 423-24. According to Gary Wills, "One
has to remember the period in order to understand the impact" of Hellman's role:
She could have been held in contempt .... The engagement was especially
dangerous .... Lillian's stand made it much easier for those who followed her
to defy that dread request for names. Eric Bentley calls her stand a "landmark"
in his book on the Committee, and Walter Goodman notes that Arthur Miller
repeated her arguments almost exactly when he appeared. Murray Kempton
found her testimony a sign of hope in that darkest farthest reach of
McCarthyism.
G. Wills, Introduction to L. Hellman, Scoundrel Time 30-33 (1976).
170. See W. Wright, supra note 5, at 337-42, 346-49, 364.
171. See id. at 337.
172. Sheed, supra note 146, at 5.
173. The political differences between Hellman and McCarthy started in the 1930s
with the Moscow purge trials, which divided the intellectual left, including Hellman and
McCarthy, and continued through the Spanish Civil War. The differences resurfaced in




In 1979, Mary McCarthy taped an interview for the Dick Cavett Show
in which Cavett asked her: "Who are some authors who are overrated,
and we could do without, given a limited amount of time?" McCarthy
responded with a variety of late authors' names. Cavett then asked:
"We don't have the overphrased [sic] writer anymore?" Answered Mc-
Carthy: "At least I'm not aware of it. The only one I can think of [is] a
holdover like Lillian Hellman, who I think is tremendously overrated, a
bad writer, and dishonest writer, but she really belongs to the past, to the
Steinbeck past, not that she is a writer like Steinbeck." Cavett followed
up: "What is dishonest about her?" Replied McCarthy: "Everything.
But I said once in some interview that every word she writes is a lie,
including 'and' and 'the.' ",174
McCarthy's television comments inevitably remind a reader familiar
with Hellman's work of the line in The Children's Hour when one of the
slander victims declares: "there isn't a single word of truth in anything
you've said."'175 Hellman, like her character in The Children's Hour, felt
that there wasn't a single word of truth in any of McCarthy's comments
and responded with the famous libel suit. At the age of 75, she sued
McCarthy, Cavett, the producer, and the broadcaster in New York State
Supreme Court, seeking $2,250,000 in damages.
A libel suit has all of the ordinary dangers of litigation plus its own
peculiar ones. Starting any litigation is to embark on a serious and un-
certain adventure. Litigation is never pleasant and always expensive.
Trial preparation, appeals and other delays slow down the legal process.
A libel suit, moreover, opens up the plaintiff to all sorts of exposure.
Hellman's decision to sue for libel was, therefore, important. Probably
no one would have criticized her if she had abstained from the legal bat-
tle; indeed there were many reasons for abstaining. By bringing suit,
Hellman put her integrity and honesty as a writer squarely on the line.
Every word she ever wrote in a long lifetime of writing would be scruti-
nized and checked by lawyers and paralegals looking for factual errors.
evening's major sponsors and McCarthy was one of its very vocal dissenters. See C.
Rollyson, supra note 5, at 203, 512; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 387-89. Competition
between two literary figures may have fueled the fight. In a 1980 interview, after filing
her suit, Hellman spoke of how McCarthy had always given "my plays bad reviews," and
had "been unpleasant to me the few times I've been near her." Warga, Hellman at 75:
Fragile But Furious, reprinted in J. Bryer, supra note 9, at 276. Hellman thought McCar-
thy was jealous: "I just don't understand jealousy of literary work." Hellman added: "I
long ago learned literary ladies come in two classes. Not necessarily writers, but literary
ladies. They're either the nicest people in the world, the most trustworthy or they're sort
of low down in a way that is hard to understand. They have no standards or low stan-
dards." Id. at 276-77.
174. Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 2-3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.)
(decision on summary judgment).
175. Six Plays, supra note 21, at 49. One is also reminded of Simone de Beauvoir
saying to Jean-Paul Sartre: "All your books are full of lies." Goodman, Sartre and
Friends in Two-Part Series, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1987, at C22, col. 2.
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She would start a legal war that was bound to be long and nasty, and,
given the parties involved, would cost her some supporters in the literary
world. There was the further possibility that even if Hellman ultimately
won, she might only be awarded a nominal amount, a not uncommon
outcome in libel cases. Or, Hellman might win in front of a jury, only to
have an appellate court reverse or substantially reduce the verdict.
Hellman must have been acutely aware of all these considerations.176
She had to consider whether she was overreacting to the situation and
whether she had, in her mid-seventies, the stamina to see this legal ordeal
through to the end. There were also alternatives. She could have re-
sponded with her tongue or able pen.
The Hellman-McCarthy libel suit was a classic legal confrontation,
pitting two important societal interests against each other. On one hand
was the fundamental interest in free expression and public discussion-a
"preferred freedom"-represented by McCarthy. On the other was
Hellman's interest in her personal and professional reputation. As the
United States Supreme Court determined in 1966, the individual's right
to the protection of his good name "reflects no more than our basic con-
cept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."' 77 Hellman thought
she was vindicating this "pervasive and strong" interest in her reputa-
tion. She commented: "But I am not a liar and I do not believe it is
anybody's right to call me a liar in space without proving it."' 78
Much has been written about the Hellman-McCarthy legal feud,179 but
little if anything has been written about the legal outcome of the case.18 0
In this sense, Hellman's own case illustrates the lasting effects of libel she
176. Her attorney certainly would have explained the difficulties that she would face as
a libel plaintiff. Hellman was represented by Ephraim London, an experienced and cul-
tured New York attorney.
177. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. Warga, Hellman at 75: Fragile But Furious, reprinted in J. Bryer, supra note 9, at
276. Hellman understood that freedom of speech is not the only precious freedom, and
that the thorny problem is to reconcile the individual's interest in her reputation with
freedom of speech. Recognizing this problem, Hellman was careful in her own writing to
avoid being sued for libel. See Meras, Lillian Hellman Hasn't Gone Fishin; reprinted in
id. at 285. "I changed people [in my writing] not for gentlemanly reasons ... but to
avoid lawsuits." Id.; see also Doudna, A Still Unfinished Woman: A Conversation with
Lillian Hellman, reprinted in id. at 199 (changed names in her writing to avoid causing
pain to people and to avoid litigation).
179. See, e.g., Goodman, Literary Invective, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983, § 7 (Book
Review), at 35; Kakutani, Hellman-McCarthy Libel Suit Stirs Old Antagonisms, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 19, 1980, at C21; Kaus, The Plaintiffs Hour, Harper's, March 1983, at 14;
Mailer, An Appeal to Lillian Hellman and Mary McCarthy, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1980,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 3; Simon, Literary Lionesses, Nat'l Rev., May 16, 1980, at 614;
Slade & Ferrell, Literary Quarrel Turns Litigious, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, § 4, at 7.
180. One possible reason for the lack of commentary on the legal outcome is the fact
that the court's decision on summary judgment has not been printed in the bound
volumes, either official or unofficial, of case reports. The only printed versions are in The
New York Law Journal (the daily legal newspaper for New York courts) and the Media
Law Reporter. See Hellman v. McCarthy, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1789 (1984).
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had described in The Children's Hour. Everyone still remembers what
McCarthy said about Hellman, particularly the reference to "and" and
"the," but few know that a judge later ruled that Hellman's suit should
proceed to trial, finding that McCarthy's comments could be defamatory
and the product of actual malice."' These fascinating legal points, gen-
erally unknown, are at least as interesting as the personalities involved
and have remained hidden too long behind the famous personalities of
the litigation.
The case culminated in a ruling by New York State Supreme Court
Justice Harold Baer, Jr. in May 1984, denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment except as to Dick Cavett.'82 As to the other defend-
ants, the case was slated for trial on the merits.183 One month later
Hellman died. Although the outcome of the trial will never be known,
this ruling was itself a victory for Hellman because her libel suit survived
a serious challenge.1 14
There were five basic steps in Justice Baer's legal analysis, each of
which was important and somewhat controversial. The court first deter-
mined the appropriate legal standards to use in deciding the motion for
summary judgment.8 5 Ordinarily, courts look with disfavor on sum-
mary judgment as it is a drastic remedy that cuts off a litigant's right to a
trial. "'86 For this reason, summary judgment may be granted only where
there is no material issue of fact to be tried.' 87 After noting the legal
debate whether a lesser standard should apply in libel cases because sum-
mary judgment "assists in ensuring free and uninhibited debate by obvi-
ating protracted and expensive litigation," '88 Justice Baer rejected
181. See C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 523.
182. See Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co.).
183. Given Judge Baer's ruling in 1984 removing the last obstacle to a trial, it is some-
what puzzling to learn that in late 1986 one of Hellman's antagonists-Martha Gell-
horn-said: "That case of Mary McCarthy... would never have come to trial, because
there isn't anything you can't prove Hellman a liar on." Davie, Life as Fiction, supra
note 8, at 60.
184. See R. Smolla, Law of Defamation § 12.07 (1988) (discussing summary judgment
in libel cases).
185. See Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co.).
186. See, e.g., Egelston v. State University College, 535 F.2d 752, 754 (2d Cir. 1976)
(emphasizing that "summary judgment must be used sparingly 'since its prophylactic
function, when exercised, cuts off a party's right to present his case to the jury' ") (quot-
ing Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1320 (2d Cir. 1975)); Andre
v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361, 364, 320 N.E.2d 853, 854, 362 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (1974)
("Since [summary judgment] deprives the litigant of his day in court it is considered a
drastic remedy which should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence
of triable issues.").
187. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. § 3212 (McKinney 1970 &
Supp. 1989); see also Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co.).
188. Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.).
Before Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979), "a consensus appeared to be
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McCarthy's argument and concluded that a libel case calls for the same
summary judgment test as any other lawsuit. I89 Thus, the court had to
determine if there was a material triable issue of fact to warrant denial of
summary judgment.
The court proceeded to determine if the language complained of was
susceptible of the particular defamatory meaning ascribed to it by
Hellman."9 ° The court conceded that "the average listener might per-
ceive the language 'every word she writes is a lie' as rhetorical hyper-
bole."'' But, added Justice Baer, "the same listener could find that the
thrust of the remarks taken together meant that the plaintiff misrepre-
sents the facts in her writings." ' 2 Thus, the court ruled that the con-
tested statements were reasonably susceptible of a defamatory
connotation, and it was for the jury to determine" 'whether that was the
sense in which the words were likely to be understood by the ordinary
and average reader.' "'I'
The court's next step was to decide whether Hellman was a public
figure,' 94 in order to establish the applicable standard of proof. If the
court determined she was a public figure, the law would impose on
Hellman a higher standard of proof: the "actual malice" test announced
in 1964 in the Supreme Court's landmark first amendment case of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'95 This standard asks whether the defend-
ants uttered the statements in question knowing them to be false or with
reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. 19 6 Surprisingly, Justice Baer
said: "At this stage of the lawsuit and on the record before me, I am
unable to find as a matter of law that the plaintiff is a public figure." '197
emerging that summary judgment was 'favored' in defamation cases." R. Smolla, supra
note 184, § 12.07[1l][b], at 12-32; see, e.g., Guam Federation of Teachers v. Ysrael, 492
F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1974) ("When civil cases may have a chilling effect on First
Amendment rights, special care is appropriate."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974).
Hutchinson cast some doubt on this consensus, see Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 120 n.9, and
several courts took a more "neutral" position on summary judgment in defamation cases.
See R. Smolla, supra note 184, § 12.07[2][a], at 12-33. Yet the weight of authority still
favors the use of summary judgment in defamation cases. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986) ("claim should be dismissed so that the
costs of defending against the claim . . ., which can themselves impair vigorous freedom
of expression, will be avoided"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987).
189. See McCarthy, at 7, col. 2. Justice Baer placed himself squarely in the "neutral"
camp on the issue of summary judgment in libel cases. Accord Yiamouyiannis v. Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc., 619 F.2d 932, 940 (2d Cir.) ("neither grant nor
denial of a motion for summary judgment is to be preferred"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839
(1980).
190. See McCarthy, at 7, col. 2.
191. Id. at 7, col. 3.
192. Id.
193. Id. (quoting James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 419, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871, 874
(1976)).
194. See id. at 7, col. 3, 12, col. 4.
195. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
196. See id. at 267-92.
197. Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 12, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.).
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Although the court admitted Hellman is "widely known and, indeed,
widely read," 198 it said something "[m]ore is required"'1 99 than notoriety.
According to Justice Baer, the gist of the public figure line of cases is to
afford enhanced constitutional protection for libel defendants "when,
coupled with some general notoriety, the language complained of was
used by the defendant in the context of plaintiff's participation in a pub-
lic issue, question or controversy." 2" Under this standard, Hellman did
not qualify as a public figure. This holding is open to question.2"1
The fourth step in the analysis considered whether McCarthy's com-
ments were statements of opinion or fact.2°2 According to the United
States Supreme Court, opinions cannot be the basis of a libel claim be-
cause there is no such thing as a false opinion.20 3 Justice Baer looked at
McCarthy's remarks and said, "To call someone dishonest, to say to a
national television audience that every word she writes is a lie, seems to
fall on the actionable side of the line'' 2° and "does not clearly pass the
test as an opinion.' ' 20 5 As statements of fact, McCarthy's comments
could therefore support a libel claim.
Finally,206 the court assumed for the purposes of the motion that the
constitutional shield of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan207 and its prog-




201. A commentator described Justice Baer's public figure ruling as "[o]ne of the few
aberrations from the pattern" that "[w]riters, artists, and critics of all kind are usually
held to be public figures, at least with regard to critiques of their literary or artistic en-
deavors." R. Smolla, supra note 184, § 2.21[6], at 2-67. He also noted that:
While it is of course true that Lillian Hellman did not invite Mary McCarthy
to appear on television and label Hellman a dishonest writer, Hellman did write
and have published a great many plays and books, and by that voluntary activ-
ity did in fact thrust herself into the arena of literary criticism. The better view,
and the view certainly more in line with the mainstream of authority, is that any
writer, artist, or critic of Hellman's stature is a public figure as a matter of law
in connection with any statements concerning his or her creative efforts.
Id. at 2-68.
202. See Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 12, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co.).
203. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
204. Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 12, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co.).
205. Id. at 12, col. 5.
206. The court also addressed the media defendant's argument that mere publication
by them through the broadcast was protected by a privilege of neutral reportage. See id.
The media defendants relied on a then recent case from the Second Circuit. See Edwards
v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Edwards v. N.Y.
Times Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Justice Baer rejected that argument on the ground that
such a privilege has neither been recognized by New York State courts nor adopted by
the Supreme Court. See McCarthy, at 12, col. 5. For this proposition, Justice Baer
quoted Judge Simons' opinion in Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 478, 446
N.Y.S.2d 836, 842 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 630, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
207. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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malice."2 ° Under the Times v. Sullivan formula, a libel plaintiff must
prove actual malice. "Conceivably," said Justice Baer,
Ms. McCarthy's remarks casting doubt on Ms. Hellman's honesty and
veracity might rise to the level of reckless disregard and indifference.
The record reflects that Ms. McCarthy had only limited exposure to
the works of the prolific Ms. Hellman. Moreover, her repetition of the
remark which appeared in the Paris Metro tends to negate innocent
error and may evidence ill will, which, while not necessary to prove
"actual malice," is some proof of it.2°9
The court reached a similar conclusion as to the corporate defendants.210
Justice Baer held that "material triable issues of fact present themselves
as to whether the alleged libel and the media defendants' broadcast of
that statement rise to the level of reckless indifference and disregard. ' 211
The five issues before the court were difficult ones, most of which have
yet to be authoritatively passed on by the highest appellate courts. But
the unsettled nature of the issues only highlights the importance of the
rulings in the Hellman v. McCarthy libel case. They provide guideposts
for future courts, litigants, and lawyers, and make important contribu-
tions to a continuing legal debate.
Beyond the legal issues lurks the broader issue of the appropriateness
of such a suit, which Justice Baer began to address:
Conceivably, there are those who believe that constitutional protection
should be broadly applied where one author/critic sets out after an-
other author/critic, and there are those, too, I suppose, that consider
the plaintiff-author endowed with an adequat [sic] verbal arsenal to
respond in kind and, indeed, with ample access to print and other me-
dia to vent just such a response.212
Although Justice Baer found this point of view irrelevant to the law,
others regard it as the principal issue. Writer Wilfred Sheed, for exam-
ple, thought Hellman's lawsuit "foreclosed what might have been an epic
debate between two serious writers" 213 over the basic question, "what is
truth?"214
C. Movie Rights v. Television Rights
In the late 1960s, Hellman sued Samuel Goldwyn Productions and
Columbia Broadcasting System for breach of contract. 215 It was a case
208. See Hellman v. McCarthy, N.Y.L.J., May 29, 1984, at 7, col. 3-4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co.).
209. Id. at 12, col. 5.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 12, col. 4.
213. Sheed, supra note 146, at 5, col. 1.
214. Id.
215. See Hellman, 32 A.D.2d 287, 301 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1969), aff'd, 26
N.Y.2d 175, 257 N.E.2d 634, 309 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1970). A new biography of Goldwyn
refers to the case. See A. Berg, Goldwyn 499 (1989).
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of first impression to determine whether a contract for movie rights to a
play also included television rights. In a 1940 contract, Hellman granted
Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. all motion picture rights to her play The Little
Foxes. Goldwyn in turn licensed CBS to exhibit Goldwyn's movie of The
Little Foxes on television. After CBS televised the movie, Hellman
claimed that the television showing was unauthorized and unjustly en-
riched Goldwyn and CBS at her expense.216
Hellman argued that television rights should be the subject of a sepa-
rate transaction.217 She argued that television rights should be retained
because, in 1940, television was in its infancy and thus not contemplated
by the contracting parties.218 This argument was buttressed by her reten-
tion of the radio rights to the play. The widespread economic and legal
ramifications of the case made it the subject of intense interest through-
out the entertainment industry.219
Hellman lost, but not without a fight up to the highest court in New
York State. In 1970, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously af-
firmed the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment dis-
missing Hellman's case.22° After analyzing the contract, the Court of
Appeals described Hellman's position as "without merit. '221 It distin-
guished a precedent where the court had held that "'talkie rights,' un-
known at the time of the contract, were not within the contemplation of
the parties. '222 According to the Court of Appeals,
Construction of the entire agreement reveals neither ambiguity nor tri-
able issues. The intent of the parties is clear from the language of the
contract. Goldwyn's licensing of CBS was a proper exercise of its pow-
ers under the contract. This, then, was a proper case for summary
judgment on behalf of the defendant.223
Although the particular outcome of this case did not favor Hellman, it
reveals much about her attitude toward the law. She demonstrated that
she would fight to protect her economic rights under the law. She dis-
played no fear of using the law imaginatively to clarify what she believed
to be ambiguities in contract language, and she was prepared to operate
within the system to challenge the wealthy and powerful. Finally, she
proved that she would go to bat not only for herself but for other writers
whose rights were affected by changing technology. From this perspec-
tive, the case was a victory.
216. See Hellman, 32 A.D.2d at 288, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
217. See id. at 288, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 166.
218. See Hellman v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods, 26 N.Y.2d 175, 180-81, 257 N.E.2d 634,
636, 309 N.Y.S.2d 180, 183 (1970).
219. See W. Wright, supra note 5, at 313.
220. See Hellman v. Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 26 N.Y.2d 175, 257 N.E.2d 634, 309
N.Y.S.2d 180 (1970).
221. Id. at 180, 257 N.E.2d at 636, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
222. Id. at 180-81, 257 N.E.2d at 636, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 183 (quoting Kirke La Shelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 83-84, 188 N.E. 163, 165 (1933)).
223. Id. at 181, 257 N.E.2d at 636, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
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D. Copyright in Letters
One event in Hellman's life raised a legal question that continues to
confound courts. In the 1970s, a former lover of Hellman named David
Cort announced that he was going to print fifty-year-old love letters that
Hellman had written to him.224 Hellman threatened to sue Cort to pre-
vent the publication.225
Hellman, apart from any emotional outrage, was acting on a rule of
copyright law stating that the "[a]uthor of letters is entitled to a copy-
right in the letters." '226 Although the paper on which the letter is written
belongs to the recipient, it is the author who has the right to publish it or
to prevent its publication.227 Before 1978, "unpublished letters, like
other unpublished works, were protected by common law copyright." '228
The Federal Copyright Act of 1976229 "preempted the common law of
copyright... and brought unpublished works under the protection of
federal copyright law, which includes the right of first publication among
the rights accorded to the copyright owner."230 Thus, because Hellman
was the author of the letters, under the common law of copyright or as a
matter of federal copyright, she was on solid legal ground in asserting her
right to stop their publication.
Undoubtedly, Hellman was aware of a famous case decided not too
long before involving Ernest Hemingway. In 1968, the New York Court
of Appeals ruled on a suit23 brought by Hemingway's estate and widow
against Random House and A.E. Hotchner, author of the book Papa
Hemingway. The issue in the Hemingway case was whether conversa-
tions could become the subject of common law copyright, "even though
the speaker himself has not reduced his words to writing." '232 Although
the Court ruled that Hemingway had implicitly authorized publication of
his conversations,233 in the course of its opinion, it distinguished conver-
sations from personal letters.234 An author, said the Court, has a com-
mon law copyright in the contents of a personal letter.235
224. W. Wright, supra note 5, at 49.
225. Id.
226. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
213 (1987); see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); 1
Nimmer on Copyright § 5.04, at 5-32 (Supp. 1988); W. Patry, Latman's the Copyright
Law 130 (6th ed. 1986).
227. See Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 605-06, 97 N.E. 109, 111-12 (1912).
228. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 94.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
230. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 94 (citation omitted).
231. See Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d
250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1968).
232. Id. at 344, 244 N.E.2d at 252-53, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 774-75.
233. See id. at 349-50, 244 N.E.2d at 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
234. See id. at 350-52, 244 N.E.2d at 256-58, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 779-81.
235. See id. at 346, 244 N.E.2d at 254, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 777.
The same issue arose in a recent case involving an unauthorized biography of writer
J.D. Salinger, the reclusive author of The Catcher in the Rye. See Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213 (1987). In 1986, Salinger
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E. Wills and Estates
Not even death could halt Hellman's involvement with the law. Her
last will and testament itself became the subject of a lawsuit.236 The cen-
tral issue was whether Hellman bequeathed her interest in her literary
works to her literary property fiduciaries or to her residuary estate to be
divided into two funds and to be administered by two separate sets of
trustees.237
After Hellman died in June 1984, three persons named in her will as
"Literary Property Fiduciaries" brought a legal proceeding in the Surro-
gate's Court of New York County to construe the will.2 38 These three
petitioners claimed that Hellman's will spelled out their duties, compen-
sation, and specific powers, but it did not explicitly give them a trust to
administer.239 Hence they argued that the will should be construed as
creating a trust of Hellman's copyright interests in her own literary
works with the three petitioners as trustees.24° In addition, the petition-
ers argued they should be appointed trustees of the literary works of Da-
shiell Hammett, which were bequeathed to a trust under the will.241 The
sought a preliminary injunction to stop Ian Hamilton and Random House from publish-
ing a book containing several of Salinger's previously unpublished letters. Id. at 94. The
letters were in various university libraries, to which they had been donated by the recipi-
ents. The trial court denied the injunction, see Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F.
Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213
(1987), and the Court of Appeals reversed, both courts agreeing that the main issue was
whether the biographer had made "fair use" of his subject's unpublished letters. See
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 213
(1987). Both courts also agreed that the author of personal letters is entitled to copyright
in those letters. See id. at 94.
If Cort had in fact gone ahead and published Hellman's letters, perhaps Hellman, given
her litigious personality, would have made good her threat and sued. Presumably, a
court would have recognized her copyright in the letters, based on the Hemingway case
and a long line of precedents. The outcome of the case might then have turned, as it did
in the Salinger case, on the precise way in which Cort published the letters, that is, on
whether Cort had made "fair use" of them. The purpose of Cort's use and the amount
and substantiality of the portion of the letters used would have been highly relevant to
that determination. See id. at 96-100.
Most recently, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the first amendment
should be taken into account in determining whether publication of a book may be barred
on copyright grounds, even when only a small amount of previously unpublished mate-
rial, like letters, is quoted. See New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir. 1989) ("first amendment concerns not accommodated by the Copyright Act"
irrelevant to issuance of injunction). The decision extends Salinger and challenges "[t]he
right of historians and biographers to quote from letters, diaries and other unpublished
primary source material." See McFadden, Court Challenges Scholars' Right to Quote
from Private Documents, N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
236. Estate of Lillian Hellman, 134 Misc. 2d 525, 511 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Surr. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1987).
237. See id. at 529, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 488.





executors of the will agreed that a construction of the will was necessary,
but took no position on the issue.
The case came before Surrogate Marie Lambert,242 whose decision on
Hellman's will reflects great sensitivity to Hellman's presumed intent.
"The testatrix," said the Surrogate, "was a complex person who executed
a complex will."' 243 She continued, "While her literary works can be
characterized as creative genius, her will cannot." 2" Surrogate Lambert
then referred to "amorphous and conflicting provisions" in Hellman's
will.
245
To resolve these conflicts, the Surrogate ruled that "the sole purpose
for the creation of the literary property fiduciaries was that [Hellman's]
literary work would be handled in a unified, expert and appropriate man-
ner."'24 6 In language well suited to her literary subject, the court held
that:
bestowing the mantle of the traditional trustee upon the literary prop-
erty fiduciaries does not adequately reflect the special burdens imposed
by a literary property res. The management of literary property is
more than the economic stewardship of a limited and wasting monop-
oly conferred upon an author under the copyright laws. How such
literary property is exploited affects not only economic aspects of the
author's works, but the esteem in which the author is held. As such,
management of a literary work requires a delicate balance between
economic enhancement and culturual [sic] nurture. Traditional trust-
ees, emphasizing prosperity rather than posterity may be forced to
concern themselves solely with keeping the books rather than keeping
the flame.24
7
Surrogate Lambert concluded that the literary property fiduciaries
should handle all aspects relating to the literary works.248 This decision
demonstrates how a court, faced with an ambiguous will, should inter-
pret it in light of the decedent's intent and public policy. In Hellman's
case, intent and public policy coincided for the purpose of protecting lit-
erary works after the author's death.249
242. Surrogate Lambert, a former plaintiff's personal injury lawyer, is, at age 68, an
activist judge who has a hard time staying above the courtroom fray. Lambert often acts
as advocate for the party she thinks is right. She is said to be less concerned with what
the law is than with finding a result that is just, fair, and equitable. Surrogate Lambert
once said, "I think I'm always on the side of truth and justice. You can always predict
that if somebody doesn't tell me the truth, or tells me a half truth, I'm going to react."
Pollock, Lambert Sets Her Own Rules, Manhattan Lawyer, May 11, 1987, at 20, 21.
243. Estate of Lillian Hellman, 134 Misc. 2d 525, 526, 511 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486 (Surr.
Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. 529, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
247. Id.
248. See id.
249. Cf. Valente & Michaels, Literary Property in Estate Planning and Administration,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1987, at 1, col. I (discussing complexity of Hellman's will and special
sensitivity required where literary property involved). The award of legal fees in the
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III. HER LAST LEGAL STATEMENT
Shortly before her death, Lillian Hellman used the context of a lawsuit
to utter what in effect was her last important public statement. Vanessa
Redgrave had sued the Boston Symphony Orchestra ("1350") for break-
ing a contract with her under political pressure in 1982.2"° Before the
cancellation was made public, the BSO's stage manager accused the Sym-
phony of blacklisting, a subject not unknown to Lillian Hellman.251
In the spring of 1984, the BSO had moved for summary judgment
dismissing Redgrave's claim.252 As Ms. Redgrave's attorney, I asked
Hellman if she would submit an affidavit on blacklisting in opposition to
the BSO's motion. She agreed.
In an affidavit dated May 22, 1984, Lillian Hellman went on public
estate proceeding became another issue for the Surrogate to resolve. See Estate of Lillian
Hellman, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1987, at 14, col. 3 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co.). In that decision,
Surrogate Lambert again stated: "This construction proceeding was occasioned by the
conflicting and ambiguous terms of the will regarding the decedent's intellectual prop-
erty.. .. The pre-residuary dispositions raised a number of questions requiring this
Court's guidance." Id.
As if the foregoing legal episodes were not enough, there were others in Hellman's life.
When The Children's Hour was banned in Boston because of its controversial theme,
Hellman joined the producer in bringing an unsuccessful lawsuit to lift the ban. W.
Wright, supra note 5, at 101. After she and the same producer, Herbert Shumlin, ended
their professional partnership, Hellman was involved in litigation with the Internal Reve-
nue Service over the division of tax refunds stemming from the partnership. Id. at 205.
Perhaps her most painful exposure to the law was watching its effect on her companion
Dashiell Hammett. Hammett, subpoenaed to testify in court about communist associa-
tions, refused to testify and went to jail. D. Johnson, supra note 1, at 3-12, 238-64; C.
Rollyson, supra note 5, at 312. Hellman saw the resulting physical deterioration of Ham-
mett, knew the magnitude of his legal expenses, and helped to meet those expenses. See
C. Rollyson, supra note 5, at 312-13, 342; W. Wright, supra note 5, at 241. It is simply
inconceivable that such an exposure to the law would not affect Hellman deeply and
lastingly.
One anecdote about Hellman and the law sheds more light on her irascible and litig-
ious nature. In the 1950s, Hellman was working on an adaptation of Jean Cocteau's The
Lark, a play about Joan of Arc. Hellman asked Harvard literature professor Harry Levin
for help, and he found two students to translate from French to English. When the
translation was done, Hellman refused to pay the students on the ground that their trans-
lations were single-spaced rather than double-spaced. Threats of litigation followed
before the dispute resolved itself. W. Wright, supra note 5, at 263-64.
250. For descriptions of the Redgrave case, see Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orches-
tra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985), vacated, 831 F.2d 339 (1st Cir. 1987),
modified, 855 F.2d 888 (Ist Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989).
Additional opinions are located at 557 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1983) (motion to dismiss
complaint) and 399 Mass. 93, 502 N.E.2d 1375 (1987) (certified questions of state law
from federal court of appeals).
251. Redgrave and Hellman had met during the filming of "Julia." In 1983, while
filming "The Bostonians," Redgrave visited with Hellman on Martha's Vineyard and
read aloud to her for hours.
252. See Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated Mar. 28, 1984, Redgrave
v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (No. 82-3193),
vacated, 831 F.2d 339 (1st Cir. 1987), modified, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en bane),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 869 (1989).
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record in support of Redgrave's case.2 53 Hellman had nothing to gain
personally from doing so-just the feeling of once again doing what she
thought was right although others might disapprove.
Hellman began her affidavit by pointing out that she had "first-hand
knowledge, unfortunately, of how blacklists work in the entertainment
industry." '254 Her own experience had taught her "how writers and per-
formers can be economically punished for their political views. ' 255 Con-
sequently, she considered herself "an expert witness on blacklists. 2 6
She recalled telling her own story of being blacklisted in Scoundrel
Time. "It is not a pleasant story," she said in her affidavit, "it was not a
pleasant thing to live through. But it is vital that Americans know and
understand what happened to me in the 1950's. ' ' 257 Then she went on to
describe those events:
As a direct result of my congressional appearance and the press cov-
erage of it, I suffered greatly. My life changed dramatically. There
were many who did not call me and who were worried about the con-
sequences of seeing me. I could not earn a living. In effect I was
banned from writing movies....
I believe I was typical of blacklist victims. One day I could work at
my craft, the next day I could not. One day the offers would pour in,
the next day there would be no offers.258
Movingly, Hellman then described her confusion at being blacklisted:
I was shocked and angered by what happened to me. But my shock
and anger was directed primarily against what I thought had been the
people of my world. As I wrote in Scoundrel Time, "I had, up to the
late 1940's believed that the educated, the intellectual, lived by what
they claimed to believe: freedom of thought and speech, the right of
each man to his own convictions, a more than implied promise, there-
fore, of aid to those who might be persecuted." It never occurred to
me that I or anyone else could be punished for exercising my inherited
rights; "certainly there could be no punishment for doing what I had
been taught to do by teachers, books, American history. It was not
only my right, it was my duty to speak or act against what I thought
was wrong or dangerous."...
Then, as now, "lives were being ruined and few hand [sic] were
raised in help. Since when do you have to agree with people to defend
them from injustice?"2 5 9
253. See Affidavit of Lillian Hellman at 4, Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra,
Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Mass. 1985) (No. 82-3193), vacated, 831 F.2d 339 (Ist Cir.
1987), modified, 855 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 869
(1989).
254. Id. at 1.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2.
258. Id. at 2-3.
259. Id. at 3-4.
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Hellman's eloquent but little known affidavit in the Redgrave case,
which helped defeat summary judgment, was to be her last important
public statement. She died five weeks later on June 30, 1984.
Hellman was one of the first to realize the implications of the Redgrave
case and of its "ominous resemblance to the political blacklists of thirty
years ago.""26 She saw, as her affidavit so eloquently demonstrates, that
the case echoed arguments made during the McCarthy era by studios
defending their firing and blacklisting of writers and performers who had
suspect political views or associations.26' Hellman understood that
blacklisting begins when employers--especially great commercial, artis-
tic, and cultural institutions--cave in to intolerance.262
When people criticize Lillian Hellman for lacking commitment or
sincerity, I must disagree. Courage, commitment and a deep understand-
ing of American liberty she had aplenty, right up to the end of her life.263
CONCLUSION
Law played a large part in Lillian Hellman's work and life. Her popu-
lar and controversial memoirs raise important questions about the mean-
ing and value of truth in law as well as in art. In her life, she freely and
frequently exercised her fundamental legal rights, speaking out on behalf
of freedom of thought and freedom of speech, defying an intrusive con-
gressional committee with simple American political courage and suffer-
ing financially as a result, petitioning or threatening to petition the courts
to protect her when she thought she was wronged. She used the law not
only for herself but for others as well.
Lillian Helman was, as the court noted in the dispute over her will, a
"complex person." There are those who found her difficult, mercurial,
nasty and unlikable, and some incidents in her life did show her to be
prickly at times. But much the same could and has been said of figures
like Rousseau, Shelley, Marx and Nietzsche, whose personalities were
often less than winning but whose work was important.264 We do not
260. See Heins, The Clearing of Vanessa Redgrave, The Nation, Dec. 12, 1987, at 714.
261. See id; see also Hentoff, The Case of the Frightened Symphony, The Progressive,
Feb. 1985, at 25-27 (criticizing BSO for firing Redgrave for political reasons).
262. See Heins, supra note 260, at 715; see also V. Navasky, supra note 168, at 423
(Hellman "a private in a virtual army of resisters," taking risk for common good).
263. As Vanessa Redgrave stated, "[t]he moral superiority of Lillian Hellman... was
real, and existed on the basis of what she did when put to the test, and how she paid for
fighting for principles. . . ." Redgrave, supra note 8, at 12.
Vanessa Redgrave greatly admired Lillian Hellman and her stand against the House
Un-American Activities Committee. When Redgrave decided to sue the BSO for what
she considered blacklisting, she may have regarded that decision as akin to Hellman's test
with HUAC. At the trial in 1984, Redgrave briefly wept on the witness stand when a
question reminded her of her friend, Lillian, who had died a few months before. Lillian
Hellman's example, which is "why she is loved and respected," id., doubtless influenced
Vanessa Redgrave during a similar ordeal.
264. For the most recent of such discussions, see generally P. Johnson, supra note 2
(critical profiles of several intellectual figures).
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have to like a writer's personality; the test is what she wrote and did. In
Helman's case, it is precisely her abrasiveness that may have impelled
her to use the law, whereas others, more docile, less quarrelsome and less
contentious, would never have contemplated confrontation through the
courts. The complexity of Lillian Hellman's personality intertwined with
the complexities of the law to knit together a spellbinding literary-legal
life.
